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INTRODUCTION: LOOKIN' FOR LAW IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES1
For more than a quarter of a century, federal administrative law has
been dominated by the so-called Chevron doctrine, which prescribes judicial
deference to many agency interpretations of statutes. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 for which the doctrine is named, has
become the most cited case in federal administrative law, and indeed in any
legal field, 3 and the scholarship on Chevron could fill a small library.4 Love
it5 or hate it,6 Chevron virtually defines modern administrative law.
Anyone who has ever taken a course in administrative law or legislation
knows the Chevron mantra:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 7
Even after almost thirty years and thousands of recitations, unanswered
questions about this Chevron framework abound. Does this framework
involve two distinct analytical steps or just one unitary decision about the

1. With acknowledgment to the one-shot country cool ofJohnny Lee.
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. U. L. REv.
551, 551-53 (2012).
4. A simple Westlaw search of the "Journals & Law Reviews" database for "(467 /2
837) & Chevron" yielded 8,656 hits on August 17, 2012. For a similar search involving
article titles, see generally Peter L. Strauss, Essay, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them
"Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight", 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1143 (2012).
5. See, e.g, Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE LJ. 511, 516-21 ("[I]n the long run Chevron will endure... because it more
accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its needs.").
6. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 779, 782 (2010) ("[T]he
Chevron doctrine . .. has proven to be a complete and total failure, and thus the Supreme

Court should overrule it at the first possible opportunity.").
7. 467 U.S. at 842-43 (internal footnotes omitted).
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reasonableness of an agency's interpretation? 8 When is the intent of
Congress "clear" on a "precise" question of statutory interpretation? 9
What might make an agency's statutory interpretation something other
than a "permissible construction"?10 To what class of agency legal
interpretations does this framework apply?II
We do not intend to answer any of these questions here. Our goal is,
rather, to help explain why such questions have proven so contentious and
seemingly intractable despite decades of prodigious case law and
scholarship on judicial review of agency legal interpretations. We suggest
part of the problem is the continuing insistence, even by people who know
better, on answering questions about the Chevron doctrine by invoking the
Chevron decision. The two have very little to do with each other. The
modern doctrine of federal court review of federal agency interpretations of

8. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009) (advocating
the one-step position); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 884 n.78 (1992)
(noting the Chevron framework can be formulated easily as one question); Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597
(2009) (arguing that the two-step inquiry is an "artificial division" that leads to confusion).
But see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Essay, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 VA. L.
REV. 611 (2009) (defending the two-step formulation, which continues to dominate the case
law).
9. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 608-57 (6th ed. 2012)
(discussing ambiguities in Chevron's first step); Melina Forte, May Legislative Histoy Be Considered
at Chevron Step One? The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Geiser,
54 VILL. L. REV. 727, 728 n. 11 (2009) (comparing judicial and scholarly opinions on the
amount of ambiguity needed for statutory meaning to be unclear).
10. There is no universally accepted test for determining when an interpretation is
impermissible or, as modern cases tend to frame it, unreasonable. It is particularly unsettled
whether an interpretation can be unreasonable only when it deviates too far from the statute
or also when it is inadequately explained by the interpreting agency. See LAWSON, supra note
9, at 779-85 (noting agency interpretations rarely fail at the reasonableness stage of Chevron
analysis unless the interpretations "fail completely to advance the goals of the underlying
statute" or are too "bizarre" to warrant closer analysis); Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and
Process: Agency Duties of Explanationfor Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 316 (1996)
("Participants in and observers of the federal administrative scene have not adequately
distinguished among judicial review of the outcome of the agency proceeding, the procedures
employed by the agency in reaching that outcome, and the process ofdecisionmaking, or chain of
reasoning, by which the agency reached its conclusions.").
11. This is the now famous "step zero" problem, first given that label by Thomas W.
Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's
Domain, 89 GEO. LJ. 833, 836 (2001) (introducing the initial inquiry needed to determine if
Chevron analysis is necessary). For other surveys of the step-zero inquiry, see LAWSON, supra
note 9, at 551-608 (reviewing the types of agency legal interpretations given Chevron
deference); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's step-zero analysis is overly complex and should be abandoned in favor of a
simpler approach favoring ordinary Chevron analysis).

4
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statutes does not stem in any substantive way from Chevron. Rather, it
comes from a series of lower court decisions in the mid-1980s that
converted a narrow Clean Air Act case about imaginary bubbles over
factories into a generalized doctrine of administrative law. The Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine from that line of decisions essentially by default.
Accordingly, there is no canonical decision systematically laying out either
the theory or practice of Chevron. The Chevron decision itself is a very poor
well from which to draw because it did not create, or purport to create, the
doctrine that bears its name. The result of this unsystematic origin of the
Chevron doctrine is a great many unanswered questions about the Chevron
methodology, a great deal of wiggle room for a wide range of answers to
those questions, and no chance whatsoever of finding definitive answers in
the place in which too many people continue to look.
At one level, everyone already knows that the issuing Court, and the
arguing parties, did not view the Chevron decision as having any broad
implications for administrative law. However, for some odd reason, people
seem unwilling to follow through on the obvious conclusion that referring
to the Chevron decision to answer questions about the Chevron doctrine is
pointless and counterproductive.
Our goal in this Article is to rid the administrative law world of
references to the Chevron decision-except in cases involving the Clean Air
Act and imaginary bubbles over factories, to which it surely continues to
have strong relevance. We do so by tracing in detail the origins of the
Chevron doctrine, primarily in the D.C. Circuit in the years immediately
following the Chevron decision. We believe the process by which the Chevron
doctrine developed is a fascinating piece of legal history in its own right,
and that story deserves to be told even if it fails to lay the ghost of Chevron to
rest.
In Part I, we set out some preliminary matters, including the state of the
law in 1984 when Chevron was decided, and some methodological problems
related to our survey of both pre- and post-Chevron case law. We show that
the best account of pre-Chevron law involved classifying agency legal
decisions as either "pure" or "mixed/law-applying" questions and then
employing rebuttable presumptions of de novo judicial review to the former
and deferential judicial review to the latter. The precise contours of those
classifications, the strength of the presumptions, the circumstances that
would overcome the presumptions, and the degree of deference due to
mixed or law-applying interpretations are impossible to specify-which in
part explains the attractiveness and ultimate success of the Chevron
revolution.
In Part II, we briefly revisit the oft-told story of the Chevron decision,
explaining that the Court in 1984 saw itself as restating and applying the
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long-settled law described in Part I. We add very little to the seminal and
definitive work of Professor Thomas Merrill on this subject, which has justly
and correctly elevated this view of Chevron to the status of conventional
wisdom.
Part III then shows how lower courts molded the narrow, unpromising
Chevron decision into a revolutionary doctrinal engine. We trace the
evolution of Chevron through every significant lower court decision in the
first year-and-a-half after Chevron was decided, illuminating the many ups
and downs in the breadth of the courts' readings and applications of
Chevron. This non-linear developmental process was hardly complete by
1986, but at that point one could meaningfully speak of a "Chevron
doctrine"-uncertain, unelaborated, in many ways protean, but a doctrine
nonetheless-that was surely not on the mind of anyone on the Supreme
Court in 1984 and that had the potential to transform administrative law
practice.
Part IV describes how those lower court developments uneasily found
their way into Supreme Court jurisprudence, where they continue to guide
doctrine in the misguided name of the Chevron decision. This process of
incorporation, or more precisely migration, was hardly what one normally
expects from landmark Supreme Court doctrines.12 The Court never
straightforwardly faced down the crucial questions posed by the Chevron
framework. Instead, the Court stumbled into the Chevron doctrine in a
series of cases that avoided, rather than confronted, the major issues.
Perhaps no one should see how laws, sausages, or the Chevron doctrine are
made, but we are going to discuss the latter nonetheless.
Part V briefly concludes with some implications of this research for
modern doctrine, most of which amount to the proposition that judges,
lawyers, and scholars should stop talking about Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. However, we do not argue here that any
particular aspect of modern doctrine is substantively correct or incorrect.
We express no view on whether the Chevron doctrine in general is a step
forward or backward from what preceded it. We argue only that any
debate on such questions should take place without reference to the Chevron
decision itself.
In sum, we come not to praise (or criticize) Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counci Inc., but to bury it.

12. But see Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, "Oh Lord, Please
Don't let Me Be Misunderstoodf": Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central
Frameworks, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2005) (showing that both the Mathews and Penn
Centralthree-part tests did not stem from the cases for which they are named).
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BEFORE THE DAWN

In order to evaluate the impact of Chevron on administrative law doctrine
and practice in the years shortly following the decision, one needs to (1)
discern the pre-Chevron baseline for judicial review of agency legal
determinations, (2) determine any changes to that baseline that Chevron was
seen by at least some legal actors to require, and (3) evaluate the extent to
which lower courts actually treated Chevron as effecting changes in legal
There is
practice.
None of these tasks is easy or straightforward.
considerable ambiguity about both the pre-Chevron baseline and the nature
of any changes to that baseline prescribed by Chevron. Indeed, scholars and
courts disagree about almost every aspect of those inquiries except for the
fact of ambiguity in both of them. To make matters more complicated, the
process by which Chevron became law-a series of lower court decisions and
then default acceptance in the Supreme Court-prevented those
ambiguities from being vented and resolved in an authoritative forum;
instead, they remain to this day largely submerged and unaddressed. In
addition, what matters for historical purposes is not what either Chevron or
pre-Chevron law actually said, but rather what lower courts in the months
before and after Chevron believed it to say. However, those courts almost
never articulated their beliefs, leaving much of the historical inquiry to
speculation and inference about matters that it is possible the judges poorly
understood themselves.
Nonetheless, we think it is possible to give accounts of the pre-Chevron
practice, the Chevron decision, and the understandings of that practice and
decision evinced by lower courts that permit at least tentative judgments
about the development of the Chevron revolution. We do not maintain that
such accounts are the only possible ones-though we think they are the best
available-nor do we maintain that they explain or are consistent with all
reported decisions. But to the extent that a reasonably coherent account of
the evolution of Chevron in its early days can help modern courts and
scholars wrestle with the problems that still plague judicial review of agency
legal conclusions, we think that we can provide at least a starting point for
further research.
A.

State of Confusion 3

In an article written on the eve of the Chevron decision, Professor Colin
Diver noted, "Two competing traditions in American jurisprudence address
the issue of the appropriate allocation of interpretive authority between

13.

With acknowledgement to the sheer brilliance of The Kinks.
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agencies and courts."14 One tradition, he observed, "views matters of
statutory interpretation as questions of 'law' reserved for independent
determination by the judiciary,"' 5 while the other "views agencies as
delegates, empowered by the legislature to exercise legislative power to
articulate and implement public goals,"' 6 and therefore calls for deferential
judicial review of agency legal determinations. This seeming duality in
judicial approaches had been a staple of administrative law scholarship long
before Professor Diver's article.' 7 Also, while the Supreme Court said
relatively little about it in the pre-Chevron era, lower courts were often vocal
in identifying the apparent inconsistencies in Supreme Court
pronouncements about review of agency legal conclusions.
Perhaps the most famous judicial expression along these lines came from
Judge Henry Friendly in 1976:
We think it is time to recognize ... that there are two lines of Supreme Court
decisions on this subject which are analytically in conflict, with the result that
a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the
case at hand. Leading cases support[] the view that great deference must be
given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to the
facts and that such decisions can be reversed only if without rational
basis .... However, there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free
substitution of judicial for administrative judgment when the question
involves the meaning of a statutory term. 18
Other courts echoed Judge Friendly's sentiments. In Hi-Craft Clothing Co.
v. .NLRB,'9 a Third Circuit panel in 1981 stated the court's role in reviewing
agency legal determinations "is an uncertain one." 20 After surveying a
substantial number of Supreme Court decisions, including a slew
specifically involving the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the
court agreed with Judge Friendly that "it is time to recognize that there are

14. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549,
551 (1985). This article was published after Chevron but obviously written beforehand.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe,Judicial Review: Question ofLaw, 69 HARv. L. REV. 239 (1955)
(refuting that agencies have no lawmaking abilities and positing that agencies share the
ability to determine questions of law with their "senior partner[s]," the courts); Nathaniel L.
Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470 (1950)
(advocating judicial deference toward reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language when courts retain ultimate responsibility for interpreting statutory
meaning).
18. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal
footnote omitted), affdsub nom. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
19. 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981).
20. Id. at 912.
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two lines of Supreme Court decisions on the subject which are analytically
in conflict."2 1 In 1984, just months before the Chevron decision issued,
several panels of the D.C. Circuit weighed in on the subject. In Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22Judge Mikva, writing for a unanimous
panel that included then-Judge Scalia, observed:
The parties sharply contest the standard of review we are to apply to
determine whether [the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)]
abnegation of all power to reach vessel emissions is "not in accordance with
law."
One reason for this dispute is that the case law under the
Administrative Procedure Act has not crystallized around a single doctrinal
formulation which captures the extent to which courts should defer to agency
Instead, two "opposing platitudes" exert
interpretations of law.
countervailing "gravitational pulls" on the law. At one pole stands the
maxim that courts should defer to "reasonable" agency interpretive positions,
a maxim increasingly prevalent in recent decisions. Pulling in the other
direction is the principle that courts remain the final arbiters of statutory
meaning; that principle, too, is embossed with recent approval. 23
In Trailways, Inc. V. ICC,24 a unanimous panel, consisting ofJudges Wright,
Wilkey, and Wald noted:
The Commission suggests that, because the regulation at issue is an agency
interpretation of one of its own governing statutes, it is entitled to great
judicial deference. Trailways, on the other hand, argues that courts are the
final arbiters of the meaning of statutes, and that this court therefore must
exercise its own judgment.. . . The principle urged by the Commission and
that advanced by Trailways, though conflicting, are both well-entrenched in
the case law.25
It is, of course, one thing to say that there are competing lines of
authority, and quite another that those lines are irreconcilable or that there

21.

Id. at 913-14.

22. 725 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 767 (internal citations omitted). The court determined that it did not need to
decide the appropriate level of deference because the decision to remand the case to the
agency
is not based upon our assessment of the accuracy of the result reached by the agency,
but rather upon the agency's complete failure to consider the criteria that should
inform that result; as a consequence, whatever deference might be owing to the
agency's conclusions under other circumstances, on this issue none at all is warranted.
Id. at 768. In other words, the agency decision was held to be "arbitrary or capricious"
because there was a defect in the agency's decisionmaking process. See LAwSON, supra note
9, at 706-08 (describing the differences among judicial review of agency outcomes,
procedures, and decisionmaking processes).
24. 727 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
25. Id. at 1287 (internal citations omitted).
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are no principles determining when one or the other is appropriate. While
some notable figures in the pre-Chevron period were prepared to state the
latter, 26 there were also plenty of others who sought some kind of order in
the seeming chaos of conflicting standards of review. 27
We do not believe any single principle can either account for all
pre-Chevron Supreme Court decisions or-more to the point for this studydescribe the views of all pre-Chevron lower courts about the law prescribed
by pre-Chevron Supreme Court decisions, but we do think that such
decisions and views converge on the key inquiry, implicit in Judge
Friendly's description in Pittston Stevedoring: whether the legal question
decided by the agency and under judicial review is a pure question of legal
interpretationor a mixed question of law application to a particularset offacts. In the
former, reviewing courts would presumptively conduct de novo review,
subject to modification by various factors counseling deference in specific
cases. In the latter, courts would presumptively grant great deference to the
agency, reviewing its decision only for reasonableness, and again subject to
modification by various factors counseling against deference. Before we
present the evidence in favor of this account of pre-Chevron law, which is
hardly original with us, 28 several preliminary issues about the nature of
administrative deference must be addressed.
First, the word "deference" is used in many different senses, and its usage
A full
is not always consistent even within individual opinions.29
exploration of the concept of deference would require a book (which one of
us is currently planning), but certain ideas central to the Chevron saga must
be clarified at the outset.
Deference can mean anything from complete entrustment of
26. See Kenneth Culp Davis, 'Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 635, 670-71 (1966) (emphasizing the Supreme Court's use of both
analytical and practical approaches to distinguish between questions of law and fact).
27. For notable efforts to rationalize the varying approaches, see Diver, supra note 14,
at 599 (arguing that the choice of a standard of review involves dividing interpretive power
between "the bureaucracies of court and agenc[ies]"); Jaffe, supra note 17, at 275 (noting
judicial review should ensure not only that agency decisions comport with the governing
statute but also with the statutory scheme, common law, and Constitution); Ronald M.
Levin, Identifying Questions ofLaw in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. LJ. 1, 63 (1985) (positing that
disagreement over the scope of judicial review can be a result of underlying judicial
uncertainty over the substantive law at issue); Nathanson, supra note 17, at 491-92 (finding
judicial deference to rational administrative judgments can comport with the Administrative
Procedure Act).
28. This is more or less the schema Nathaniel Nathanson identified more than half a
century ago. See Nathanson, supra note 17, at 470 (identifying a doctrine ofjudicial review
that does not require courts to decide if the agency's decision is right, but only if it is
reasonable).
29. For similar observations, see Strauss, supra note 4, at 1145.
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decisionmaking authority to another-essentially the absence of review-to
a simple acknowledgment that someone else has an opinion on the subject.
This possible range in the scope of deference afforded administrative legal
interpretations has been an important part of administrative law doctrine at
least since Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 30 and whenever one sees the word
"deference," one must accompany it with the question: "How much?" The
answer to the question is critical: "reasonableness review" and "careful
respect" can both legitimately be called "deference," but it is wildly
misleading to lump them together for purposes of a scholarly study. A good
portion of the time, however, judges who use the term "deference" may not
have thought very hard about its different meanings, which makes
generalizations about deference based on scrutiny of judicial opinions very
treacherous.3l We do not have a solution to this problem other than to
acknowledge it openly and to tease out the usage intended in any given
context.
More importantly for this study, there can be very different reasons for
affording deference, in any particular degree, to agency decisions-or
indeed to any kind of decisions.32 Sometimes, one might defer to the views
of another because one thinks the other's decision is good evidence of the
right answer. That is, one sets out with the express goal of determining the
correct answer to a problen but concludes along the way that someone else
is better situated to resolve all or some portion of that problem. For lack of
a better term, we call this kind of evidence-based deference epistemological
deference.
On other occasions, one might give deference to another's decision
simply because it is their decision, without regard to whether it is good or
bad evidence of the right answer. Consider the treatment of jury verdicts.
Jury decisions get deference-and in the case of acquittals in criminal cases,
absolute deference-simply because they are jury decisions, with no caseby-case assessment of whether any particular jury was likely to have gotten
the right answer. Again, for lack of a better term, we call this kind of
deference based simply on the identity of the prior decisionmaker legal
deference. Of course, a well-functioning legal system is unlikely to craft a
regime of legal deference unless there are plausible reasons to think the
actors to whom deference is given are likely to reach right answers in a wide
range of cases, but once the system of legal deference is in place, there is no
30. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
31. See Diver, supra note 14, at 565-67.
32. The foregoing typology of reasons for deference was given in Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 81 IoWA L. REv.
1267, 1271, 1278-79, 1300-02 (1996) (listing and elaborating upon legal deference, pragmatic
deference, and epistemologicaldeference).
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need to consider whether any given decision shows specific indicia of
correctness.
Epistemological deference, as we have described it, does not require any
specific doctrine for implementation. It is simply common sense applied to
the task of figuring out right answers. If the views of another actor are
relevant for the correct resolution of a dispute, it would be bad judgment
33
So-called
not to consider those views for whatever they are worth.
34
non-binding
in
such
expressed
views
agency
in
which
Skidmore deference,
instruments as amicus briefs and interpretative rules are given whatever
35
respectful consideration their reasoning and pedigree warrant, is a species
of epistemological deference. It makes no more sense to treat Skidmore
deference as a "doctrine" than it would to formulate a doctrine called
"Lawson deference" for giving weight to Gary Lawson-authored amicus
briefs to reflect (if one wisely deems it a fact) that Gary Lawson is more
likely to be right about certain matters that he has studied in great depth
than would be a judge who has not engaged in that study.
In this Article, we are primarily concerned with legal deference: the
extent to which courts are obled to give a certain degree of deference to
agency legal decisions simply because they are the legal decisions of
agencies. That is plainly the kind of deference about which the various
debates over Chevron are concerned. To be sure, courts do not draw, and
have never drawn, the distinction between legal and epistemological
deference as sharply as we do here. Indeed, that particular distinction is
not even part of formal legal vocabulary. But it is analytically crucial to
understanding both the theoretical and practical scope of any doctrine of
deference, and we will do our best to isolate aspects of court decisions that
are best explained in terms of one or the other kind of deference. Because
we are layering this framework on top of decisions that probably did not
think about what they were doing in those terms, we are surely
"contaminating" our sample in the process. Again, we do not see any way
out of this problem other than to acknowledge it.
Second, both pre-Chevron and post-Chevron case law distinguish statutes

33. This observation is subject to the qualification that such epistemological deference
would be inappropriate if the costs of considering someone else's views, including the costs
involved in discovering, interpreting, and processing those views, exceed the likely benefits.
In that circumstance, it would be poor reasoning to engage in such deference.
34. Named for Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134, and invigorated in modern times by Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
35. See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235 (2007) (arguing that modem Skidmore
deference is conceptualized as on a sliding scale, falling either way depending on factors such
as respecting an agency's expertise and avoiding its arbitrariness).
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administered by agencies from statutes applied by agencies. Roughly speaking,
agencies administer those statutes for which they have some special
responsibility, as when an agency interprets the substantive provisions of its
own organic act. They often apply and interpret statutes for which they
have no such responsibility, either because all or many agencies equally
apply those statutes, 36 because some other agency administers the statute,37
or because the statutes are primarily entrusted to (administered by) courts
rather than agencies. 38 In this study, we confine ourselves only to the
interpretation of statutes administered by agencies. Because this particular
distinction predates Chevron, it should have little or no effect on the course of
doctrinal development. All cases upon which we focus involve statutes
obviously administered by the agencies in question, under either pre- or
post-Chevron law.
Third, agency conclusions of law are, at least formally, reviewed
differently from agency determinations of policy. Policy decisions are subject
to review under § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which tells courts to reverse agency decisions that are "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 39
Technically, one could use this same provision as the statutory source for
review of agency legal conclusions (and one encounters some cases that do
so), but the application of this provision to agency policy determinations is
quite different from any application to agency legal conclusions. As the law
has developed over the past half-century, agency policy decisions-or at
least policy decisions of threshold consequence-are reviewed under the socalled "hard look doctrine," which requires agencies to articulate the
reasons behind their actions and requires courts to ensure agencies have
36. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified in scattered sections scattered of 5 U.S.C.); Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No.
96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Back Pay Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-380, 80 Stat. 94 (codified in 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1966)); Federal Tort
Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
37. For example, a ratemaking agency may well have to apply and interpret the
Internal Revenue Code, but only the Internal Revenue Service administers the code.
38. The U.S. Department of Justice, for example, does not administer (in the
specialized administrative law sense) the federal criminal code; the courts do. Provisions in
organic acts for judicial review of agency decisions also fall into this category. See Murphy
Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478-80 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding congressionally imposed jurisdictional limits to preclude Chevron deference to
an agency). One might think the same of statutes of limitations in organic acts, but the case
law on that point is oddly inconclusive. See AKM LLC v. Sec'y of Labor, 675 F.3d 752,
754-55 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (leaving the question open); id. at 764-69 (Brown, J., concurring)
(arguing, forcefully, that agencies do not administer such provisions).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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seriously considered both the problems before them and their relevant
factors. 40 This review, which focuses on the process by which agencies
reach and justify conclusions, is quite different from substantive review that
focuses on whether the agency's outcomes accord with external sources,
such as the record in the case of agency fact-finding or statutes in the case
Unfortunately, the line between agency
of agency law-finding.
policymaking and agency law-finding is anything but sharp, especially in a
4
world from which the nondelegation doctrine has been largely expunged. '
If a statute is sufficiently vacuous, an agency's "interpretation" of that
statute simply cannot be described as interpretation. The task of giving
meaning to an empty shell of a statute is legislative rather than legal or
interpretative. For example, if an agency administers a statute instructing
the agency to award licenses for the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity," all agency actions under that statute formally are
"interpretations" of the statute, but in reality the agency is constructingrather
than construing the law through its actions. The statute empowers the
agency but does not constrain it in any serious way. But because the form
of the agency's action is "interpretation" of a statute, a reviewing court
might cast its analysis in terms of reviewing an agency's statutory
construction, when in fact the court is (or should be) reviewing the agency's
exercise of policymaking discretion.
There is no clear line describing when agency action taking the form of
statutory interpretation is instead best treated as an instance of agency
policymaking. We here exercise some measure of ill-defined judgment
when deciding which cases to include in our sample of decisions involving
review of agency legal conclusions. We do not believe that changing our
sample at the margins would alter our results in any noticeable way, but we
think it necessary to note the problem.

B. From the Beginning42
Consider three noteworthy cases involving agency interpretations of
43
statutes decided between 1941 and 1951: Gray v. Powell, NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc.,44 and OLeary v. Brown-Pac/ic-Maxon, Inc.45 Each case
reflects a pattern of judicial review that serves as a framework for the law

40. See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 697-709.
41. See id. at 786-87.
42. With acknowledgement to the artistry of Emerson, Lake, and Palmer.
43. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
44. 322 U.S. I 11(1944).
45. 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
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leading to Chevron and beyond. 46
Gray involved an interpretation of the Bituminous Coal Act of 193747 by
the Director of the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of the
Interior. The Act authorized the Agency to prescribe a detailed code for
the regulation (really the cartelization) of the bituminous coal industry. To
coerce coal producers to submit to the regulatory scheme, the Act imposed
a punitive 19.5% tax "upon the sale or other disposal of bituminous coal
produced within the United States, when sold or otherwise disposed of by
the producer thereof,"48 with a blanket exception from the tax for any
producer who was a "code member" 49 under the statute and whose
transaction complied with the code.50 For purposes of the tax provision,
the Act defined "disposal" of coal to "include[ ] consumption or use ... by
a producer, and any transfer of title by the producer other than by sale," 51
but then carved an exception from the terms of the coal code for "coal
consumed by the producer or .. . coal transported by the producer to
himself for consumption by him." 52 The effect of these provisions was to
exempt from the code, and therefore from the punitive tax for noncompliance with the code, coal that was consumed by its producer.
Seaboard Air Line Railway Company was a large coal consumer. If it
had bought coal on the open market from a mine, there is no doubt that
such a transaction would have come within the purview of the statute and
thus would have needed to comply with the code provisions to avoid the tax
penalty. If it had owned its own mine, hired its own employees to mine
coal, and then consumed the coal from its own mines, there is no doubt it
would have fallen within the statute's producer/consumer exception.
Seaboard did neither of these things. Instead, it leased coal lands and then
hired an independent contractor to mine the coal and deliver it to
Seaboard.53 Seaboard owned the coal, for all common-law purposes, from
ground to locomotive, but at some point the coal had to be transferred from
the possession of the independent mining company that dug it up to
Seaboard. Seaboard (through its receiver) asked the Director of the
46. The discussion in this section draws upon material found in Professor Lawson's
casebook.
See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 502-33.
He is profoundly grateful to
Thomson/Reuters for permission to use and adapt that material.
47. Pub. L. No. 75-48, 50 Stat. 72 (codified but repealed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 828-52
(2006)).
48. Id. § 3(b), 50 Stat. at 75.
49.

Id.

50. There was also an exception from the tax for any coal sold exclusively to a
governmental entity. Id. § 3(e), 50 Stat. at 75-76.
51. Id. § 3(a), 50 Stat. at 75.
52. Id. § 4(1, 50 Stat. at 83.
53. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 407-09 (1941).

2013]

MA4vG LAW OUT OFNOTHINGATALL

15

Bituminous Coal Division to declare these transactions exempt from the
54
coal code, but the Director refused.
On appeal, Seaboard advanced two arguments. First, it argued that it
was the actual producer of the coal, as if it had hired its own employees
rather than independent contractors to mine it.5 If that argument had
been correct, Seaboard would clearly be exempt from the code as a
producer or consumer. Second, it argued that even if its independent
contractor was the coal's actual producer, the coal's transfer of possession
from the contractor to Seaboard was not a "sale or other disposal" subject
55
to tax for non-compliance because the coal's title never changed hands.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the agency on both counts-but did
so for very different reasons and with very different accounts of agency
deference.
Regarding whether Seaboard was the coal's actual producer, the Court
declared after examining in detail the contractual arrangements between
Seaboard and one of its contractors:
The separation of production and consumption is complete when a buyer
obtains supplies from a seller totally free from buyer connection. Their
identity is undoubted when the consumer extracts coal from its own land
with its own employees. Between the two extremes are the innumerable
variations that bring the arrangements closer to one pole or the other of the
range between exemption and inclusion. To determine upon which side of
the median line the particular instance falls calls for the expert, experienced
judgment of those familiar with the industry. Unless we can say that a set of
circumstances deemed by the Commission to bring them within the concept
"producer" is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the
Commission as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the
57
Court's duty to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed.
This is very strong deference indeed. The Court reviewed the agency
decision for reasonableness rather than correctness.58
Regarding whether transactions between a producer (assuming, as the
agency and Court found, that the independent contractor was the
producer) and Seaboard were outside the scope of the Act because there
was no transfer of tide to the coal, and therefore no "sale or other disposal"
within the statute, the Court affirmed the agency in a lengthy discussion

54. See id. at 403-05.
55. See id. at 411.
56. See id. at 414-15.
57. Id. at 413.
58. Three Justices would have reviewed this decision de novo.
(RobertsJ., dissenting).

See id. at 417-18
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that made no reference to deference.59 The Court simply determined, after
what appears to be strict de novo review, that the agency had construed the
statute correctly. The shift in both the opinion's analysis and tone from one
issue to the other is inescapable.
There is an obvious difference between those issues that readily explains
their treatments.6 0 The question whether a "sale or other disposal" of coal
within the meaning of § 3(a) of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 requires a
transfer of title to the coal is a question requiring no special knowledge of
the coal industry to answer. A law professor in an ivory tower who has
never seen a lump of coal could apply ordinary tools of statutory
interpretation (language, structure, legislative history, purpose, etc.) to
discern the best construction of the statute. The legal question involved is
abstract, or pure, in the sense that it can be addressed in principle using
nothing more than conventional tools of legal analysis. By contrast, the
question whether Seaboard was a "producer" of coal when it leased the
mines but hired contractors to mine them is not necessarily answerable
abstractly from an ivory tower. One could conclude that any arrangement
in which the consumer owns the mine makes that consumer the
"producer," in which case one needs only the same legal skills necessary to
determine whether a transfer of title is a statutory prerequisite for a "sale or
other disposal" of coal. But one could also believe the Act's failure to
provide a definition of "producer" suggests a more calibrated inquiry, in
which case "producer" status other than at the obvious poles (open-market
purchases and own-employee mining) may turn on subtleties in the
particular arrangements between the mine-owning consumer and the
workers who mine the coal. In that circumstance, detailed knowledge and
expertise in the coal industry may be essential to a reasoned determination
of whether any particular entity is a "producer." More precisely, figuring
out whether an entity such as Seaboard is a producer may require an
inductive rather than deductive form of inquiry. Instead of fixing the meaning
of the statute and then asking whether Seaboard maps onto that meaning,
one might instead define the statute precisely by a common-law-like process
of inclusion and exclusion, based on detailed study of the specific facts
governing Seaboard's transaction. This kind of inquiry is best described as
law application-the application of legal terms to specific factual settingsrather than law determination-the abstract ascertainment of statutory
meaning. In that context, it makes sense to give deference to the

59. See id. at 414-17 (basing their decision strictly on a de novo review).
60. We do not mean to suggest that the Court's differential treatment of these issues
was inevitable, or even doctrinally correct. Three Justices in 1941 obviously thought
otherwise. We mean only that the Court's differential treatment is understandable.

2013]

3MAlNGLAW

OUT OFNOTHLNGATALL

17

supposedly expert agency charged with the task of applying that particular
statute.
So understood, Gray v. Powell describes a framework in which the
deference afforded agencies in their legal interpretations depends to a great
degree upon the kind of legal interpretation involved. Pure, abstract, "ivory
tower" legal questions call for de novo review, while fact-bound, inductive,
law-application questions call for a good measure of deference.
This pattern was at work in many pre-Chevron cases. In JNLRB v. Hearst,
one of the most famous of the New Deal-era administrative law cases, the
NLRB determined that newsboys-generally adult vendors with fixed sales
locations-were "employees" for purposes of the mandatory-bargaining
provisions of the Wagner Act. The statute unhelpfully defined (and still
defines) an "employee" as "any employee." 61 The newspaper company
refused to bargain with the newsboys' union on the ground that the
Wagner Act incorporated the common law distinction between employees
and independent contractors and that the newsboys were independent
contractors rather than employees under generally accepted common law
principles. The Court affirmed the agency decision, but as in Gray did so in
two distinct steps.
First, the Court rejected the newspaper's claim that the Wagner Act's
definition of "employee" incorporated common law standards for
determining employee status. The Court's discussion of that statutory
interpretation point was lengthy, employing a range of considerations
including the need for national uniformity, the uncertainty of the common
law standard(s), and the purposes of the policies of the Wagner Act.62 At no
point did the Court indicate as relevant that the NLRB had already
construed the statute in that fashion. Rather, the Court engaged in de novo
review-as one would expect from the framework set forth in Gray v. Powell.
After all, the question whether the word "employee" in the Wagner Act is
meant to incorporate pre-existing common law standards for determining
employee status is a classic pure, abstract, ivory tower legal question. One
can ask and answer it without knowing anything about the newspaper
industry-and indeed without knowing there is a controversy involving the
One only needs traditional tools of statutory
newspaper industry.
interpretation.
Once one has decided that the common law does not determine the
statute's meaning, there still remains the problem of interpreting and
applying the statute in the case at hand. The newspaper likely would have
won (as it did in the lower court) if the common law controlled, but that
61. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1940).
62. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-29(1944).
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does not mean that the newspaper necessarily must lose if the common law
does not control. One must still determine whether the newsboys at issue
were "employees" under whatever non-common-law meaning of the term
applies in the Wagner Act. On that question, the Court said:
[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term
in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.... [T]he
Board's determination that specified persons are "employees" under this Act
is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the record" and a reasonable basis in
law. 63
As with the determination of who is a "producer" under the Bituminous
Coal Act, the determination of who is an "employee" under the Wagner
Act seems to require an inductive process of inclusion and exclusion based
on detailed understanding of factual settings. The process of filling out the
meaning of "employee," after abstractly concluding that it cannot be
deduced from the common law, is a process of law application rather than
strict law determination, and that process plausibly warrants deference to
the agency charged with administering the statute.
This framework also appeared in O'Leay v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. 64
John Valak was an employee of the defendant company in Guam. The
company provided a recreation center that was near a channel "so
dangerous for swimmers that its use was forbidden and signs to that effect
erected." 65 While at the recreation center one day, Valak braved the
channel in an attempt to rescue some men trapped on a reef, but drowned
in the process. His mother brought a claim under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927 (LHWCA), which requires
the company to provide benefits for "accidental injury or death arising out
of and in the course of employment." 66 The agency awarded a death
benefit under the statute. The company objected that the statutory term
"in the course of employment" was meant (shades of Hearst)to incorporate
pre-existing common law standards, and that Valak's actions, however
noble, were surely a frolic and detour under common law and not subject
to the statutory compensation provisions, as the Court of Appeals
concluded.
The Court agreed with the agency that the statute extended beyond the
common law meaning of "course of employment,"67 but, as in Gray and

63.

Id. at 131.

64. 340 U.S. 504 (195 1).
65.

Id. at 505.

66. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1946).
67. O'Leat, 340 U.S. at 506-07.
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Hearst, did so with no mention of agency deference. The question whether
the LHWCA meant to define "course of employment" by strict reference to
the common law is clearly a pure and abstract "ivory tower" legal question
requiring no special expertise in employment relations to resolve. One
could ask and answer it without knowing whether any specific dispute turns
on the answer.
Once one extends the statute beyond the common law, however, there
remains the problem, as there was in Hearst, of determining whether this
particular action by this particular employee fell within the expanded
boundaries of the statute. The resolution of that problem, as with
establishing the statutory meanings of "producer" and "employee," is the
kind of inductive, fact-specific, law-application question for which
deference is appropriate under the Gray framework; and the agency got
plenty of deference on that point. 68
The Gray/Hearst/O'Learyframework provides a workable and plausible,
even if not inevitable or incontestable, mechanism for reviewing agency
legal determinations. It is not always easy to determine whether a legal
question is a "pure" question of law determination or a "mixed" question of
law application, but it is often a straightforward inquiry. Once that
classification is made, the appropriate deference rule seems to follow
automatically.
Of course, this Article would probably be unnecessary if things were that
simple. The framework was never that simple, so understanding preChevron law requires attention to several modifications to the framework.
C. Burning Down the House69
The need for some kind of modification to the framework became very
clear in 1947 when the Court decided PackardMotor Car Co. v. NLRB.7o As
in Hearst, the question concerned whether a particular class of persons were
"employees" under the Wagner Act. This time, the class of persons was a

68. See id. at 507-09. The Court's discussion was a bit muddled by its willingness to
indulge the agency Deputy Commissioner's labeling of the question of "course of
employment" as a question of fact. Of course, it is not a question of fact, and of course
Justice Frankfurter, who authored the majority opinion, knew that it was not a question of
fact. The best reading of the opinion, given that it was issued on the same day as Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), is thatJustice Frankfurter meant that the degree
of deference afforded agency applications of law is comparable in scope to the degree of
deference afforded agency findings of fact under the "substantial evidence" standard of
review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
69. With acknowledgement to the Talking Heads, who Professor Lawson does not
think were as brilliant as The Kinks or as artistic as Emerson, Lake, and Palmer.
70. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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group of foremen at an auto plant, who the NLRB determined were an
appropriate bargaining unit under the statute. The company countered
that the foremen-with responsibility for managing, disciplining, and
making recommendations concerning line employees-were part of the
"employer" under the statute rather than employees. By a 5-4 vote, the
Court agreed with the NLRB-but Congress agreed with the company and
promptly passed the Taft-Hartley Act, overruling the decision.
For our purposes, whether the Court correctly or incorrectly interpreted
the Wagner Act does not matter. All that matters is that the Court affirmed
the agency without resorting to any deference. Indeed, the only mention of
the agency's prior decision was a recitation offered by the company of the
agency's checkered history of "inaction, vacillation and division . .. in
applying this Act to foremen." 71 The Court's response was that "[ilf we
were obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in
finding the meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of the Board's
decisions would leave us in the dark," 72 but that making such reference in
this case was unnecessary "in deciding the naked question of law whether
the Board is now . .. acting within the terms of the statute."7 3
If the relevant issue of statutory meaning really was a "naked question of
law," the conclusion of "no deference" followed logically from the Gray
framework. That characterization would only be accurate, however, if the
relevant legal issue was whether all people who bore the label "foreman" at
all times and under all circumstances were outside the coverage of the Act.
That was not the issue. No one believed that a company could simply
apply the label "foreman" to someone and thereby remove that person
from the statute.
The real question was whether persons with the
responsibilities, duties, and status of the people labeled "foremen" in this
particular case were "employees" within the statute. One could resolve
even that issue as a "naked question of law" by saying, as the majority
opinion at some points seemed to say, that anyone who draws a salary from
the company is an "employee." But that would have the intriguing
consequence, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, of making corporate
executives, including the president of the company, employees subject to
the Wagner Act. 74 Charity demands that one not attribute such a position
to the Court. Accordingly, the best interpretation of the opinion is that it
really was treating the relevant issue as more akin to the inductive, factspecific, law-applying process involved in deciding whether newsboys are

71.

M. at 492.

72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 493.

74. See id. at 494 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
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"employees."
On that understanding, one would expect the agency
decision to receive a great deal of deference, amounting essentially to
reasonableness review.
A long tradition of viewing Packard and Hearst in tension with each other
is explicable only by viewing Packard, despite its language, as a case
involving law application rather than law determination.75 If that is the
correct characterization of the case, then Packard does represent a break,
and a fairly sharp one at that, with the Gray framework. Why defer to the
agency's inductive construction of the term "employee" in Hearst but not in
Packard?
There are many reasons for doubting the agency's judgment in Packard.
As the company explained, the agency had vacillated for a long term. The
NLRB had also developed a reputation for being blatantly pro-labor, and
while that might not matter too much to anyone other than newsboys and
newspapers in a case like Hearst, the decision in Packard threatened to remake industrial relations across the country. 76 From the standpoint of
epistemological deference, these are all plausible reasons to refuse to defer to the
agency. But how can they be relevant from the standpoint of legal deference?
The answer must be that the framework set forth in Gray, Hearst, and
O'Leary was a presumptive framework: normally, a court defers to an agency's
exercise of law application while reviewing de novo agency exercises of law
determination, but if certain epistemologically relevant factors are present,
those default rules could be altered. Under the right circumstances,
agencies might fail to get deference in law application, as in Packard, or
receive deference in pure law determination, as arguably happened much
later in FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.77
What
circumstances are those? In 1985, Professor Diver famously identified no
fewer than ten factors that Supreme Court decisions had appeared to
regard as relevant for determining whether to grant deference to agency
legal interpretations. 78 Sometimes one could find many of those factors at
work in a single opinion.79 Accordingly, the seemingly simple framework of
75. Or at least, as explained above, the law determination aspect of the case was so
obvious that it did not warrant Supreme Court attention.
76. SeeJaffe, supra note 17, at 255 (arguing the difference of interpretations in Hearst and
Packardto be in substance rather than form).
77. 454 U.S. 27 (1981) (deferring to the agency's view that a statute forbidding political
committees from making expenditures on behalf of candidates did not prevent those
committees from acting as spending agents for other organizations).
78. See Diver, supra note 14, at 562 n.95 (listing factors such as contemporaneousness,
duration, consistency, reliance, significance, complexity, rulemaking authority, selfexecution, congressional ratification, and quality of explanation as used in determining the
role of agency discretion).
79. See 454 U.S. at 37-38.
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Gray was subject to override by a m6lange of factors, with no clear metric
for determining how much or when those factors weigh in the balance.
Another important modification to the Gray framework stems from the
On occasion, Congress will
language of certain kinds of statutes.
term is to be defined
an
ambiguous
that
expressly
indicate
and
specifically
by the agency, even where defining it could involve abstract law
determination rather than inductive law application. For example, in
Batterton v. Francis,80 the relevant statute expressly gave the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare the power to determine, through
rulemaking, the standards for "unemployment" by referring to
"unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by
the Secretary)." 8 1 While defining such a term through a rulemaking would
ordinarily involve abstract law determination, the Court noted that
Congress
expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for
determining what constitutes "unemployment" for purposes of AFDC-UF
eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary,
rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the
statutory term. In exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts
regulations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside
those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a
different manner.82
Once it is settled that assigning this law-determining power to agencies
does not violate the nondelegation doctrine,8 3 express congressional grants
of this kind amount to a command to courts to afford legal deference to
agency decisions pursuant to such statutes. Conceivably, one might be able
to infer such a command from language less than express, but presumably
that would require some kind of unusual, statute-specific evidence
indicating Congress intends agencies rather than courts to provide statutory
meaning.
Accordingly, we think the best account of pre-Chevron law is that it
required reviewing courts to conduct roughly the following inquiry:
(1) Does the agency administer the statutory provision at issue? If not,
then the agency gets, at most, epistemological deference pursuant to
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. if warranted by all of the facts and
circumstances. If yes, then:
(2) Is the agency's legal interpretation a pure, abstract, "ivory tower"
80.
81.

432 U.S. 416 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976).

82. 432 U.S. at 425 (first emphasis added).
83. That has been settled, however wrongly, for quite some time. See generally Gary
Lawson, Delegation and OriginalMeaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327 (2002).
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legal question that can be asked and answered without knowing
anything about the particular dispute before the agency? If no, the
agency presumptively gets a strong measure of deference, tantamount
to reasonableness review, unless a constellation of factors counsels
against it. If yes, the court presumptively reviews the matter de novo,
against subject to a constellation of factors that might counsel against
it.

(3) Also, if Congress has expressly entrusted the law-determination
function to the agency, then courts must honor the congressional
allocation of authority and give the agency's decision great deference
regardless of the classification of the legal question involved.
D. Is This the Real Life? Is This Just Fantasy?84
Assume that we are right about the best account of pre-Chevron law as
articulated by the Supreme Court. There still remains the question
whether that account was explicitly or implicitly accepted and applied by
lower courts in the period leading to Chevron. We cannot say every lower
court decision we have encountered is consistent with this understanding,
but the lower courts generally appeared to act in accordance with this
framework.
We looked through the Federal Reporter at every reported decision from
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided between 1982 and the issuance
of Chevron on June 25, 1984. (We looked at a non-random sample of cases
from other circuits as well, but that number is too small to change any of
our conclusions.) We selected from that sample all cases that seemed to
involve review of agency legal determinations of statutes administered by
the agency.
We have possibly wrongly omitted some decisions by
misclassifying cases involving statutory interpretation (which are relevant to
our sample) as cases involving policy determinations (which are not), but
given our results, we cannot believe that any such errors could make a
difference.85 It is also possible that the D.C. Circuit did not represent the
practices of lower courts generally, but there are strong theoretical and
anecdotal reasons to doubt whether this is a serious problem: the D.C.
Circuit set the tone for administrative law during that era-as it continues
to do today-and a quick glance at cases from other circuits does not reveal
any great differences in approach across federal courts. Accordingly, we
84. With acknowledgement to the virtuosity of Queen.
85. Could we also have wrongly included some decisions that are best understood as
policy calls rather than interpretations of statutes? Of course. As we noted earlier, the line
between questions of law and questions of policy is fuzzy at best. Again, however, we see no
way any such marginal errors could affect the validity of our overall results.
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think these D.C. Circuit cases give a good flavor for how lower courts
generally understood the law governing review of agency legal
determinations in the two years leading up to Chevron.
A significant majority of these cases involved what we would classify as
pure or abstract legal questions, and relatively few involved mixed questions
of law application. That is not surprising: appeals from rulemakings,
particularly pre-enforcement appeals, are very likely to involve such "purely
legal" questions, and in adjudications, parties are likely to focus at the
appellate level on pure legal questions. If we are right that agencies
presumptively received great deference on mixed questions of law
application but not on pure questions of law determination, it makes sense
for parties challenging agency decisions primarily to contest pure legal
questions in the courts of appeals. To be sure, courts very seldom expressly
identified the legal questions involved as being either pure or mixed. The
classifications are ours, not theirs, and conceivably a different set of eyes
would put at least some of the cases into a different category. Some of
them seem to be very close calls that could go either way. Accordingly, we
do not claim any empirical rigor for our observations. We simply offer
them for what they are worth.
Most courts facing pure or abstract questions of law decided those issues
with no significant deference, of either the legal or epistemological variety,
to the interpreting agencies. The courts often did not mention the concept
of deference, whether they were affirming the agencies8 6 or reversing

86. See, e.g., Multi-State Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 728 F.2d 1519, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(affirming, with no mention of deference, FCC's determination that the word "allocate"
does not necessarily mean "assign"); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronatics Bd.,
699 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming, with no mention of deference, the board's
determination that a statute enabling it to ensure "safe and adequate service" included the
power to regulate the quality of service and hence to regulate smoking on aircraft); BJ.
McAdams, Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming, with no mention of
deference, ICC's conclusion that it could pass on an application to remove restrictions on
service without considering issues that go back to the original license grant); Duquesne Light
Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming, with no mention of deference,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations implementing pollution penalties);
Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. FERC, 712 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming, with no
mention of deference, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) decision to
consider cost and not simply availability of alternative fuels when setting gas priorities);
Cont'1 Seafoods, Inc. v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 38, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (statute giving the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jurisdiction over "added" substances does not refer
solely to substances added by humans rather than by natural processes that occur after
production of the regulated item); Int'l Union of the United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local Unions Nos. 141, 229, 681 & 706 v.
NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming, by a 2-1 vote, the NLRB's conclusion
that state right-to-work laws foreclosed bargaining over provisions assessing union
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them.8 7 A few courts gave very brief nods to what today we call "Skidmore
deference" (or epistemological deference) in connection with pure questions
of law, but said nothing to suggest any legal deference in those
circumstances. 88
On some occasions, the courts engaged in quite substantial discussions of
statutory interpretation methodology without mentioning deference as an
element in that analysis. For example, in National Insulation Transportation
Committee v. ICC,89 the court affirmed the Interstate Commerce
Commission's (ICC's) conclusion that it had the discretion not to order
refunds when it found unreasonable a carrier's practice, but not the
carrier's ultimate rate. The court consumed four pages of the Federal
Reporter discussing statutory interpretation, but it made no reference to
deference to the agency.90 In National Soft Drink Ass'n v. Block, 9' the court
similarly held that the Department of Agriculture did not have statutory
authority to restrict sales of snack foods at all times during the school day
representation costs against non-union workers, with no mention of deference to the agency
even in response to a vigorous dissenting opinion); McIlwain v. Hayes, 690 F.2d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (affirming, with no mention of deference, FDA's conclusion that there is no
implicit statutory time limit on how long the agency can delay requirement of proof of safety
of food additives in light of changing technology); Simmons v. ICC, 697 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (affirming, with no mention of deference, an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
determination that it need not retroactively impose labor-protective conditions on
terminations of lines by state-run railroads); U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Baldridge, 677 F.2d 940,
944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming, with no mention of deference, an agency determination
that a shipping line had to repay a portion of government construction subsidies when ships
were used for domestic rather than foreign commerce, even when the domestic use was
under a military charter).
In Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court (and evidently the parties as
well) treated the relevant question-whether an "immediate hazard" includes lead in
unchipped paint-as a pure question of law, see id. at 60, and gave no deference to the
agency. See id. at 60-63. This seems to be a paradigmatic "mixed" question of law
application, but if treated as a pure question of law, the court's analysis is consistent with the
usual pattern for such questions.
87. See, e.g., Wilkett v. ICC, 710 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reversing, with no mention
of deference, ICC conclusion that the "fitness" for a license of a company can include
considering the "fitness" of its owner as an individual); Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684 F.2d
1007 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (reversing, without mentioning deference, an EPA interpretation of
the Clean Air Act that allows use of certain technologies only when use of alternative
technologies would force a plant closure).
88. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am. v. FERC, 716 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United
Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local No. 576 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 346, 351 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. United States, 675 F.2d 1248, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
89. 683 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
90. See id. at 537-40.
91. 721 F.2d 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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and at all places within schools. Rather, said the court, "An examination of
the legislative history leads to the conclusion, albeit inconclusively, that the
[c]ongressional intent was to confine the control of junk food sales to the
food service areas during the period of actual meal service." 92 The court
explained the methodology of statutory interpretation in depth93 but never
invoked deference to the agency, even though it admitted the legal question
was close. Both of these cases involved pure or abstract legal questions,
involving the statutory authority of the relevant agencies, and deference
played no role in the decisions.
Under the model we have laid out, deference would be appropriate,
even for pure questions of law, if the statute clearly or expressly allocated
authority to make those determinations to the agency. We found no cases
in our sample in which the D.C. Circuit invoked this doctrine as grounds
for deference. The court did, however, once refer to that doctrine, while
finding it inapplicable to the case at hand, because there was insufficient
evidence Congress had granted the agency such specific law-determining
authority. 94
A number of cases granted agencies deference on questions of law
application or mixed questions of law and fact, precisely as our proposed
These cases involved matters such as whether
model predicts.
promulgation of work performance standards were management
prerogatives under the federal labor laws,95 whether commercial paperspecifically "prime quality commercial paper, of maturity less than nine
months, sold in denominations of over $100,000 to financially sophisticated
customers rather than to the general public"9 6-are "securities,"97 whether
a rail carrier has an "interest" in a water carrier if the stock is held in a
voting trust,9 whether treating classes of utility customers differently results

92. Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 1352-53 (analyzing the statute by evaluating the plain meaning and
legislative history).
94. See Vanguard Interstate Tours, Inc. v. ICC, 735 F.2d 591, 595-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(finding Congress held itself as the authority in determining the right of intervention in route
application proceedings).
95. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 553, 554, 558-59 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (following the Federal Labor Relations Authority's (FLRA's) interpretation that Title
VII of the Civil Services Reform Act of 1978 guarantees work performance standards to
federal agencies' management officials).
96. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136, 151
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
97. See id. at 140 (noting specifically that "deference to an agency's construction of the
statute is called for because the agency's decision applies general, undefined statutory
terms-'notes and securities'-to particular facts" (emphasis omitted)).
98. See Water Transp. Ass'n v. ICC, 715 F.2d 581, 591-92 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding
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in "discriminatory" rates, 99 whether a certain job was "temporary,"100 and
whether a certain facility counted as a "mine." 0 1 These questions involve
clarifying the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms through case-by-case
determinations on particular facts, which are precisely the kinds of
questions that Gray, Hearst, and O'Leary presumptively entrusted to agencies.
On some occasions, courts would refuse to defer to agencies on purely
legal matters, while deferring to them on questions of law application
within the same case. For example, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 0 2
the court reversed the agency on a pure question of law by holding that a
domestic carrier who initiates a call eventually transmitted overseas by an
international carrier is the carrier that "originated" the call under the
statute and is therefore responsible for tarifling, billing, and collecting on
that call. The court made no mention of deference to the agency's view
that the international carrier could be tasked with billing and collecting
functions. 0 3 But with respect to a separate question of law applicationhow to allocate revenues when more than one carrier is involved in a callthe court explicitly gave "considerable deference"1 04 to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and found it had not acted
"unlawfully or unreasonably." 0 5
We do not suggest that every decision during this period neatly fell
within the framework laid out by pre-1984 Supreme Court case law. That
most assuredly did not happen. There was a substantial number of cases in
which courts spoke at length about deference when reviewing pure

that, despite being contingent on ICC's approval, a rail carrier's stock in the voting trust is
an "interest").
99. See City of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reiterating
that FERC's decision to charge "the Coops" and "the Cities" different rates did not qualify
as discrimination).
100. See Moon v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 727 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(contending that the Secretary did not have a reasonable basis for defining a job position as
temporary).
101. See Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 734 F.2d 1547, 1552-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("We have before us just the sort of determination the Secretary was empowered by
Congress to make. That determination is well within the bounds of reasonableness.. . and
we accord it the deference it deserves.").
102. 729 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
103. See id. at 814-15 (concluding that the statutory language and the legislative history
provide no rationale for distinguishing between domestic carriers that initiate calls
transmitted to international carriers).
104. Id. at 816. To be sure, the court emphasized that the agency had to act quickly
with very little information, see id., which could be taken to suggest that the court would find
the mere classification of the issue as one of law application to be insufficient to find
deference.
105. Id.
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questions of law,106 though it was never clear whether the courts meant
epistemological deference-which should always be on the table regardless
of the kind of legal question at issue-or legal deference. In one especially
intriguing case, the court managed to defer and not defer at the same time.
In Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 07 the comptroller construed
§ 4(a) of the International Banking Act (IBA), which authorizes the
comptroller to permit foreign banks to operate within a state when
"establishment of a branch or agency, as the case may be, by a foreign bank
is not prohibited by State law," 08 to allow the comptroller to approve
specific foreign operations, unless the relevant state would prohibit all
foreign operations of that kind. The states instead urged an interpretation
that would allow them to adopt policies that might allow some foreign
banks but not others to operate within the state; New York, for example,
sought to deny Australian banks branching rights they would grant to other
countries' banks because of a state policy to grant rights only when the
relevant foreign country extended reciprocal rights to New York banks.
The parties thus essentially disagreed about whether the phrase "a foreign
bank" in § 4(a) means "any foreign bank"-the comptroller's view-or the
specific foreign bank applying for a federal license-the states' view. The
court noted, "The language of section 4(a) does not preclude either of the
proffered interpretations" and "the legislative history of the IBA does not
offer clear guidance on the meaning of section 4(a)."l 09 "In short," said the
court, "we find two arguably correct interpretations of an ambiguous
statutory provision.""10 The court nonetheless resolved the question in the
agency's favor solely by reference to the perceived purposes of the statute,
In the next breath, however, the
with no mention of agency deference."
court granted deference to the comptroller's interpretation of § 5(a) of the

106. See, e.g., ITT World Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732, 741-42 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (emphasizing that the court must determine if FCC's interpretation of the statute was
arbitrary and capricious); Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(acknowledging that while deference is usually given to an agency's interpretation, Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA's) interpretation of the statute was unreasonable); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (recognizing
courts typically defer substantially to an agency's statutory interpretation); cf N. Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist. v. FERC, 730 F.2d 1509, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding FERC's
interpretation unreasonable and therefore reversible even if deference was granted).
107. \ 715 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (Supp. V 1982).
109. 715 F.2d at 614.
110. Id. at 615.
111. See id. at 615-17 (determining that the legislative history references congressional
intent to give foreign banks national treatment, which aligns with the comptroller's
interpretation of the statute).

2013]

ALKTNG LAw OUT OFJNOTHIJvGATAL

2
29

IBA, which forbids federal chartering of a foreign bank unless "its operation
12
The
is expressly permitted by the State in which it is to be operated."
se
per
banks
of
allowance
mean
to
"operation"
comptroller construed
with
rather than specific "operation[s]," or practices, of the bank. Again, as
the comptroller's interpretation of § 4(a), this allowed federal licensing of
foreign banks unless states prohibited the entire category of activities in
which those banks sought to engage. The court had dealt, at considerable
length, with the § 4(a) issue without even a nod to deference, but on this
matter, which seems every bit as pure and abstract as the interpretation of
§ 4(a), the court felt "obliged to defer to the Comptroller's interpretation of
the IBA because 'the interpretation of an agency charged with the
administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference."'13
Additionally, on another pure legal issue-whether foreign banks could
accept deposits from non-United States citizens under § 4(d) of the IBAthe court chastised the district court, which upheld the comptroller's
affirmative answer to that question, because it "believe [d] the District
4
Our
Court deferred to the Comptroller when no deference was due."1
model has no explanation for this case, but we defy any model to
accommodate it.
Notwithstanding the nontrivial, but nonetheless small, number of
"outlier" cases, the general pattern in the D.C. Circuit from 1982 to 1984
was broadly consistent with the scheme of review that we have attributed to
the pre-Chevron Supreme Court. The decisions generally did not speak
openly about whether they addressed pure questions of law or law
application, nor did they distinguish legal deference from epistemological
deference in any meaningful fashion. But the cases correspond reasonably
well to a framework that puts those concepts front and center. The courts
behaved as though the relevant inquiry required identification of the kind of
legal question at issue. Indeed, the pattern is strong enough to make what
followed even more remarkable than it might seem.
II. CHEVRONRISING
"Most landmark decisions are born great-they are understood to be of
112. 12 U.S.C. §3103(a).
113. 715 F.2d at 622 (quoting Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982)); see also id. at
623 (making clear that the court was reviewing the agency's decision only for
reasonableness).
114. Id. at 626. To be sure, the court held the statute's plain language, which says flatly
that "a foreign bank shall not receive deposits or exercise fiduciary powers at any Federal
agency," 12 U.S.C. § 3102(d), required reversal, which would render any deference to the
agency irrelevant, since no amount of deference can turn "shall not receive deposits" into
"shall not receive deposits unless the depositor is not a United States citizen."

0ADMINISTRATiVE Liw REVIEW

30

[[65:1

special significance from the moment they are decided."1 15 However, when
Chevron was briefed and argued in the Supreme Court, no one thought it
was a case involving any serious, general question about the standard of

review for questions of law. Instead, all the parties and the Justices
understood the case to be an important but relatively narrow dispute about
the permissibility of the "bubble concept" under the Clean Air Act, with no
broader implications for administrative law doctrine. To understand the
significance, or lack thereof, of the decision for scope of review doctrine,
one needs a firm grasp on the actual controversy in Chevron.
Fortunately, Professor Tom Merrill has exhaustively explored the
arguments and decision in Chevron," 6 and we leave the details of the Chevron
decision to him. The following paragraphs essentially summarize and
reference his analysis and conclusions, with little value added.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 required certain states with
designated pollution problems to establish a permit program to regulate
"new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution." 7 Specifically,
no permit for a new or modified stationary source could issue for so-called
non-attainment states-states failing to meet national guidelines for
specified pollutants-without meeting stringent criteria." 8 It was fairly
clear that the paradigm of a "major stationary source" was something like a
refinery, factory, power plant, or smelter. It was less clear, however,
precisely how the statute required states to treat multiple pollution-emitting
devices within a single facility. One possible interpretation of the statute
would treat each distinct opening-for example, each smokestack of a
factory or refinery-as a "major stationary source" so that no additions or
modifications even to individual smokestacks could be made without
complying with the tough permitting requirements. Alternatively, one
could treat each integrated economic unit, such as a power plant, refinery,
or other facility, as a single "source" so that modifications or additions to
some segment of the unit would be permissible without triggering the
stringent permitting requirements, as long as overall emissions from the
115.

Thomas W. Merrill, The Stoy of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
STORIES 164, 168 (William N. Eskridge,Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
116. This article is an updated version of a prior study with which we suspect many
readers are familiar. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Stoy ofChevron: The Making ofan Accidental
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006). For our
purposes, the differences between these two versions are unimportant, and we equally well
could have cited either.
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(b) (Supp. 11 1979).
118. See id. § 7503 (listing criteria as decreasing total emissions, ensuring resulting
emissions do not exceed the allowable pollutant amount for an area, and making a source's
emissions amount to the lowest possible rate).
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entire unit did not increase. (If the modification or addition substituted a
more efficient for a less efficient production process, the new or modified
source could reduce overall emissions from the plant as a whole.) After
vacillating for several years, the EPA adopted a rule embodying the latter
definition of a "source," allowing an existing plant to obtain a permit for
new equipment not meeting otherwise-applicable permit conditions if the
overall plant output of omissions did not increase. This is the so-called
"bubble concept," which treats each facility as if covered by an imaginary
"bubble" within which pollution is measured.
The Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental
9
groups challenged the EPA's rule and won in the D.C. Circuit," essentially
20
on the strength of prior precedent in that court, without much discussion
of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.121 The
"Question Presented" on which it granted review said nothing of deference,
scope of review, or even statutory interpretation. Rather, as framed by
Chevron, U.S.A.'s merits brief, the question asked:
Did the court of appeals err in substituting its judgment for that of the
Environmental Protection Agency on basic policy determinations, where the
court below did not, and could not, find the regulations to be unreasonable?
In particular, was it unreasonable for the Environmental Protection Agency
(1) to promulgate regulations which simply confirmed EPA's regulatory
definition of "stationary source" to the definition set forth in the Clean Air
Act; and
(2) to promulgate regulations which the undisputed record shows comply
22
with the Congressional purpose in enacting the Clean Air Act?'
The other merits briefs similarly framed the relevant questions without
reference to broad (or even narrow) issues of statutory interpretation. The
American Iron and Steel Institute, speaking for a wide range of industry
groups, asked:
119. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding that the EPA's use of the bubble concept, which led to decreased mandatory new
source review in non-attainment states, was impermissible).
120. See id. at 725-26 (reiterating that the bubble concept is unsuitable for programs
designated to improving ambient air quality).
121. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
122. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Chevron, 461 U.S. 956 (Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247 & 82-1591),
1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 915 at *3. We have focused on the "Questions Presented" in
the merits briefs rather than in the petitions for certiorari because the latter contained
extraneous issues regarding the exclusive role of the D.C. Circuit in reviewing EPA
regulations under the Clean Air Act. The substantive questions were framed identically at
both the certiorari and merits stages. For discussion of the EPA's petition for certiorari, see
Merrill, supra note 115, at 178-79 (articulating that the purposes of the 1977 Amendments
were to improve air quality and further economic growth in dirty-air areas).
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1. Whether the court below impermissibly intruded upon the discretion
vested in the states by the Clean Air Act when that court deprived the states
of the authority to define the term "source" as an industrial plant for their
new source review programs in nonattainment areas, even where such a
definition is demonstrated to be consistent with reasonable further progress
toward, and timely attainment of, national ambient air quality standards.
2. Whether the court below wrongfully substituted its policy judgment for
that of EPA, when it determined, without support in the language or
legislative history of the Clean Air Act or in the record before it, that EPA
had no authority to define "source" as an industrial plant or to allow the
states to adopt a similar definition of "source" for the purposes of new source
review programs in nonattainment areas.123
And the EPA's brief, filed by the Solicitor General, said that the issue
was
Whether the Clean Air Act prohibits EPA from allowing a state to adopt a
plantwide approach to new source review in nonattainment areas in
circumstances where the state can demonstrate that its State Implementation
Plan contains all of the elements required by the Clean Air Act and provides
for timely attainment and maintenance of air quality standards.1 24
Respondents, for their part, framed the issue as
Whether the court of appeals, ruling on provisions of the Clean Air Act for
meeting the health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards where
they are now violated, correctly held that the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency exceeded her authority when she
redefined the term "source" to mean whole industrial plants only and
thereby exempted from permit requirements the major industrial
installations (such as boilers and blast furnaces) built within such plants. 2 5
The substantive discussions in the briefs were similarly devoid of any
broad references to deference doctrine. No one was preparing for a debate
over general principles of administrative law.
As Professor Merrill has documented at considerable length, the oral
argument, the conference voting, and the decision-writing process in the
Court all similarly framed this case as a narrow but important question
about environmental law and policy, with no consciousness that principles

123. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Chevron, 461 U.S. 956 (Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247 & 82-1591),
1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 917 at *2. There were two other questions identified in this
brief, but they involved issues that ultimately played no role in the Chevron story.
124. Brief for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency at 1, Chevron,
461 U.S. 956 (Nos. 82-1005, 82-1247 & 82-1591), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 919 at *1.
125. Respondents' Brief in Opposition to the Petitions, Chevron, 461 U.S. 956 (Nos. 821005, 82-1247 & 82-1591), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1127 at *1.
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of deference were seriously at issue. 126 As far as statutory interpretation
doctrine was concerned, all of the parties and Justices seemed to view the
Chevron case as an application of well-settled law. That much is now beyond
cavil.
The question is how the lower courts viewed the Chevron decision. We
explore that question by focusing on cases involving review of what preChevron law would have called pure or abstract legal questions because those
are the cases in which the Chevron framework might make a difference.
Agency decisions involving mixed or law-applying questions would be
presumptively entitled to deference under pre-Chevron law, and no one has
ever suggested that Chevron be construed to lower the amount of deference
agencies would receive in that context.
III. CHEVRONASCENDANT(?)
Chevron was decided on June 25, 1984. Obviously, a good many cases
involving judicial review of agency decisions were briefed and argued in the
courts of appeals before that date but decided after Chevron issued. Lower
courts are certainly aware of major Supreme Court cases that bear on notyet-issued opinions, so to gauge the impact of Chevron, it is reasonable to
look at lower court opinions issued in the months after Chevron, even if
Chevron was not part of the briefing and argument in those cases.
Accordingly, our sample of cases includes decisions from late 1984 that
were argued before the Chevron opinion was issued.
A. Where's the Beef
Chevron got off to a very slow start. No court of appeals cited the case in
decisions issued in eitherJune orJuly of 1984. Citations in August of 1984
were limited to passing mentions involving deference to agencies in cases of
law application, to which deference was already due under the pre-Chevron
frameworkl 27: deference to the EPA in the application of criteria for
approval of State Implementation Plans under the Clean Air Act;128 and, in
126. See Merrill, supra note 115, at 180-85 (suggesting the issue in the case centered on
the bubble concept's legality).
127. See South Dakota v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 740 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing
Chevron, along with other authorities, for the uncontroversial proposition that the Civil
Aeronautics Board deserves deference when defining "essential air transportation," 49
U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1979), for communities affected by airline deregulation); see
aLso Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 85 n.21 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting, in a footnote, that
regulations defining "inpatient hospital services," 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(14) (1982), need only
be reasonable).
128. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 1984)
(remarking on the particular importance of the EPA following enacted statutory procedures
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a case that did not even involve agency interpretation of a statute, the
broad proposition that policy arguments "are 'more properly addressed to
legislators or administrators, not to judges."' 2 9 There was certainly no
consciousness in the lower courts that Chevron required any kind of
immediate reassessment of their practices in administrative law cases.
Perhaps the best indication of the post-Chevron state of the law is found in
a First Circuit opinion authored by then-Judge (and former administrative
law professor) Stephen Breyer in a case argued six weeks before Chevron was
issued, but decided on August 2, 1984. Mayburg v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services 30 involved a Department of Health and Human Services's
interpretation of provisions of the Medicare Act. At the time of the
decision, Medicare would pay for ninety days of hospital inpatient care and
one hundred days of post-hospitalization extended care during each distinct
"spell of illness,"13' which the statute defined as the period
(1) beginning with the first day (not included in a previous spell of illness) (A)
on which such individual is furnished inpatient hospital services or extended
care services, and (B) which occurs in a month for which he is entitled to
benefits under part A, and
(2) ending with the close of the first period of 60 consecutive days thereafter
on each of which he is neither an inpatient of a hospital nor an inpatient of a
skilled nursing facility.132
The question was how to handle a person who lived in a nursing home
but received only custodial, not medical, care. When that person was
released from hospitalization-let us say after ninety days of inpatient care
to make the example clear-to the nursing home, was she an "inpatient" of
the nursing facility? If so, her spell of illness never stopped, because there
was no period when she was "neither an inpatient of a hospital nor an
inpatient of a skilled nursing facility," so if she again needed hospitalization,
it would not be covered by Medicare because the ninety day limit on each
spell of illness would have been exhausted. On this interpretation, persons
who live in nursing homes would often be at risk of facing uncovered
hospitalization. On the other hand, a contrary interpretation of the statute
that would try to distinguish nursing home stays that provide medical
services from those that do not could produce many difficult cases in the
administration of the laws; it surely would be much easier to treat all
given the EPA's amount of discretion to do otherwise).
129. Pub. Inv. Ltd. v. Bandeirante Corp., 740 F.2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Mikva,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).
130. 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (1982).
132. Id. § 1395x(a).
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nursing home residents as inpatients rather than to adopt an interpretation
requiring a case-specific inquiry to determine whether any particular
resident was an inpatient.
The Department of Health and Human Services opted for the former
interpretation that treats all nursing home stays as inpatient stays even
when the resident received only custodial but not medical care, with the
effect that a spell of illness does not stop when the patient went from a
hospital to a nursing home. This interpretation of the term inpatient in the
definition of a spell of illness arguably should be a pure question of law;
whether one must receive medical services to be an "inpatient" does not
require knowledge of the facts or circumstances of any particular case.
Accordingly, a court under pre-Chevron law would decide this question
without any legal deference to the agency, barring some special
circumstance requiring it (which does not appear to be present here). If
Chevron changed the law to require the two-step framework for all cases in
which the agency administers the relevant statute, however, deference
would be appropriate because the agency administers the statute.
Judge Breyer's opinion faithfully followed the pre-Chevron framework in
He noted multiple reasons, all
rejecting the agency's interpretation.
grounded in traditional tools of statutory interpretation, why the agency's
interpretation should not be followed: the weight of prior judicial authority,
ordinary language, sound policy, canons of construction, and legislative
history.133 The agency responded to these arguments with a call for
deference, though the case was argued before Chevron could formally
provide support. Judge Breyer's answer to this call is telling, including his
reference to the recently decided Chevron decision and his effectively
distinguishing between epistemological and legal deference, and it merits
full reproduction:
The Secretary also argues that this court should simply defer to HHS's
interpretation of the statute. She points to a line of Supreme Court cases
that, she argues, compel such deference. A different line of Supreme Court
cases, however, cautions us that "deference" is not complete; sometimes a
different, and more independent judicial attitude is appropriate. Moreover,
the Administrative Procedure Act states that "the reviewing court," not the
agency, "shall decide all relevant questions of law."
In order to apply correctly what Judge Friendly has described as
conflicting authority, we must ask why courts should ever defer, or give
special weight, to an agency's interpretation of a statute's meaning. And,

133. See Mayburg, 740 F.2d at 102-03 (agreeing with the district court, Judge Breyer
detailed why the Department of Health and Human Services's interpretation should be
rejected).
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here there are at least two types of answers, neither of which supports more
than a modicum of special attention here.
First, one might argue that specialized agencies, at least sometimes, know
better than the courts what Congress actually intended the words of the
statute to mean. Thus, in Skidmore v. Swifl & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the
Supreme Court wrote
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
The fact that a question is closely related to an agency's area of expertise
may give an agency greater "power to persuade." Its interpretation may also
carry more persuasive power if made near the time the statute was enacted
when congressional debates and interest group positions were fresh in the
administrators' minds.
An interpretation that has proved to be
administratively workable because it is consistent and longstanding is
typically more persuasive, as is an interpretation that has stood throughout
subsequent reenactment of the statute. All these factors help to convince a
court that the agency is familiar with the context, implications, history and
consequent meaning of the statute. But, still, under Skidmore the agency
ultimately must depend upon the persuasivepower of its argument. The simple
fact that the agency has a position, in and of itself, is of only marginal
significance.
In the case before us, the fact that the agency's interpretation is consistent,
longstanding, and left untouched by Congress all count in its favor.
Nonetheless, HHS points to no significantly adverse administrative
consequences that might flow from the contrary interpretation. Under these
circumstances, the considerations mentioned in Part I are simply more
persuasive. They convince us, as they have convinced other courts, that in
this instance, HHS has not interpreted the statute as Congress meant.
Second, a court might give special weight to an agency's interpretation of
a statute because Congress intended it to do just that in respect to the statute
in question. In Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), for
example, the Court noted that an agency, "when it interprets a statute" may
act "as a delegate to the legislative power." And the Court added that "such
interpretive power may be included in the agencies' administrative
functions." If Congress expressly delegates a law-declaring function to the
agency, of course, courts must respect that delegation. But, if Congress is
silent, courts may still infer from the particular statutory circumstances an
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implicit congressional instruction about the degree of respect or deference
they owe the agency on a question of law. See Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). They might do so by asking
what a sensible legislator would have expected given the statutory
circumstances. The less important the question of law, the more interstitial
its character, the more closely related to the everyday administration of the
statute and to the agency's (rather than the court's) administrative or
substantive expertise, the less likely it is that Congress (would have) "wished"
or "expected" the courts to remain indifferent to the agency's views.
Conversely, the larger the question, the more its answer is likely to clarify or
stabilize a broad area of law, the more likely Congress intended the courts to
decide the question themselves.
In this instance, the "spell of illness" provision is central to the statutory
scheme. The interpretive skills called for seem primarily judicial, not
administrative, in nature. The "administrative" implications seem trifling, or
non-existent. And, nothing else suggests any specific congressional intent to
place the power to construe this statutory term primarily in the agency's
hands. Thus, the arguments for completely deferring to the agency's
34
interpretation of the statute are not strong here.1
Judge Breyer treated Chevron as a case in which Congress effectively
instructed courts to give legal deference to agencies on pure questions of
law even without an explicit directive to that effect. However, one can only
find in Judge Breyer's analysis such an implied instruction based on a
careful, multi-factor, statute-by-statute analysis, in which the more important
the question involved, the less likely one is to find an implicit instruction to
defer. One can certainly question whether the issue of interpretation
involved in Chevron was unimportant, but formally Judge Breyer simply
worked Chevron into the preexisting structure for review of agency legal
determinations and thereby gave it a very narrow construction. His
response to the agency's call for deference would likely have been
substantively identical had the Mayburg decision come out three months
earlier.
Judge Breyer reiterated this quite narrow view of Chevron a month after
the Mayburg decision. In New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission ofMaine,'35 the First Circuit held that a statute granting a
36
private right of action to parties to enforce in district court "any order"' of
the FCC did not encompass enforcement of FCC rules. The decision was
issued onJune 29, 1984. The plaintiff sought rehearing, and the FCC then
supported the plaintiFs position that the term "order" included "rule,"

134. Id. at 105-07 (some internal citations omitted).
135. 742 F.2d 1(1st Cir. 1984).

136. 47 U.S.C. §401(b) (1982).
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arguing on rehearing that its view of the statute should be given deference.
Regardless of Chevron, the most the agency could claim was Skidmore-style
epistemological deference. The agency expressed its view in an amicus
brief, and it is very hard to see how it could be thought to "administer" the
provisions of a statute authorizing private parties to bypass the agency and
sue directly in court. In a denial of rehearing issued on September 10,
1984, the court correctly observed that "[w]hile [the agency] counsel's
experience entitles his opinion to respect, it cannot bind a court as to the
meaning of a jurisdictional statute."137 Judge Breyer went on, however, to
make the following enlightening comments:
Moreover, the FCC's legal argument here threatens a highly anomalous
result. Its view of statutory construction is one that would place primary
authority to decide pure questions of statutory law in the hands of the
agency. At the same time, its interpretation of the statute in question is one
that would place considerable authority to decide questions of
communications policy in the hands of the courts. Each institution-court
and agency-would receive comparatively greater power in the area in
which it, comparatively, lacks expertise. The resulting picture is one of
classical administrative law principle turned upside down. At least, the
position seems inconsistent with the sound court/agency working partnership
that administrative law traditionally has sought.138
Note that Judge Breyer makes clear-almost three months after
Chevron-that pure questions of law are primarily for the court. His
position is grounded in a view of comparative institutional competence that
clearly echoes the "legal process" view expressed most famously by
Harvard Law School professors Henry Hart and Al Sacksl 39-which is not
surprising because Judge Breyer was a former administrative law professor
at Harvard Law School. That view is broadly consistent with what we have
described as the pre-Chevron framework, in which agencies get primary
interpretative responsibility when "interpretation" requires attention to
facts, circumstances, and policy, while courts get principal responsibility for
matters of pure legal interpretation.
It is clear that as of fall 1984, Judge Breyer and some other First Circuit

137.
138.

742 F.2d at l1.
Id.
See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William

139.
Eskdrige, Jr. & Philip M. Frickey eds., 1994) (citing Hart and Sacks's groundbreaking work
on legal process theory). On comparative institutional competence as an element of the
legal process approach, see also Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the

Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis ofInstitutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1996)
(discussing comparative
approach).

institutional competence as an element of the legal process
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judges did not view Chevron as more than modestly changing the
methodology for review of agency legal decisions, perhaps by expanding in
some slight fashion the range of cases in which one might find congressional
delegations to agencies to interpret pure legal questions.
B. A Spark of Life
In the six months following its issuance, Chevron was cited by circuit court
decisions that appear in the Westlaw database twenty-two times, eleven of
which were issued by the D.C. Circuit. Therefore, examining D.C. Circuit
opinions is the best starting point for determining whether and how Chevron
actually influenced courts' methodology in deferring to agencies. The D.C.
Circuit hears a disproportionate share of federal administrative law cases, 140
and is universally recognized as the leading court in shaping administrative
law doctrine. It is also the source of the Chevron doctrine.
In examining the cases that emerged from that circuit in 1984 and 1985,
we must engage in a bit of imaginative reconstruction. To know whether
and how any particular understanding or application of Chevron affected
case decisions, one would have to know how those cases would have been
decided if there were no Chevron doctrine. This kind of counterfactual
inquiry is particularly difficult given that the courts, both before and after
Chevron, often said little about their employed methodology and
assumptions. There is a very large risk of inferring reasons or frameworks
that simply were not present. We see no way to avoid this risk other than to
acknowledge it-and to discount to some degree whatever conclusions are
drawn from analysis of the cases. Nonetheless, we think the story of
Chevron's evolution emerges with reasonable clarity.
14
The Chevron doctrine originates with General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, '
an en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit that issued on September 7, 1984slightly more than four months after the case was argued on April 25, 1984.
The case turned on § 207(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act, which provides:
If the Administrator determines that a substantial number of any class or
category of vehicles or engines, although properly maintained and used, do

not conform to the regulations prescribed under section 7521 of this title [i.e.,
EPA emission standards], when in actual use throughout their useful life (as
determined under section 752 1(d) of this title), he shall immediately notify the
manufacturer thereof of such nonconformity, and he shall require the
manufacturer to submit a plan for remedying the nonconformity of the

140. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Lecture, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Dhiferent? A Historical
View, 92 VA. L. REv. 375, 376-77 (2006) (observing, "One-third of the D.C. Circuit appeals
are from agency decisions" and "[t]hat figure is less than twenty percent nationwide").
141. 742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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vehicles or engines with respect to which such notification is given. The plan
shall provide that the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines which
are properly used and maintained will be remedied at the expense of the
manufacturer.142
In essence, this provides for the EPA-ordered recalls of vehicle classes
that fail to meet the EPA emissions standards. The EPA interpreted this
provision to authorize recalling all members of a nonconforming class of
vehicles, except those not "properly maintained and used," regardless of the
age or mileage of any given member. General Motors, by contrast, insisted
the phrase "throughout their useful life" limited the scope of permissible
recalls to vehicles falling within the statutory criterion for a vehicle's useful
life of "five years or fifty thousand miles (or the equivalent), whichever first
occurs."14 3
This is a dispute over a pure question of law: it concerns whether the
EPA's recall authority extends to vehicles exceeding their useful lives when
a large part of their class has not done so. Under pre-Chevron methodology,
there is no reason to depart from the presumptive baseline of de novo
review regarding legal deference, leaving the Agency's reasoning to stand or
fall on its merits. This was essentially the methodology of the three
dissenting judges, who found that the usual m6lange of case-specific factors
governing the degree of (epistemological) deference to an agency counseled
against upholding the Agency's rule:
The rule was not a contemporaneous interpretation of the Clean Air Act,
and there is no evidence that it reflects a longstanding interpretation of the
Act by the agency. Nor, in my view, did the rule "simply restate[ ] the
consistent practice of the agency in conducting recalls pursuant to section
207(c)"-a proposition upon which the majority places substantial weight.
Finally-and this point can scarcely be overemphasized-the interpretative
rule at issue in this case does not involve the kind of fact-intensive questions
concerning which great deference need be given the agency's technical
expertise; rather, as the agency itself concedes, "[s]ince the rule simply
expresses an interpretation of the law based on the language, legislative
history and policy of the Clean Air Act, no factual data need be analyzed or
commented on." 1 4
The majority, however, took a somewhat different approach. Writing
for eight judges, Judge Wald seemed to view Chevron as changing and now
governing the inquiry:

142. 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(1) (1982).
143. Id. § 7521(d)(1).
144. 742 F.2d at 1574-75 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted).
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The Supreme Court has recently outlined our proper task in reviewing an
administrative construction of a statute that the agency administers. First, we
must determine whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If the administrative construction runs counter to clear
congressional intent, then the reviewing court must reject it. See id. at 842-43
n.9. On the other hand, if the administrative construction does not
contravene clearly discernible legislative intent, then the reviewing court
"does not simply impose its own construction on the statute." Id. at 843.
Instead, we then must conduct the "narrower inquiry into whether the
[agency's] construction was 'sufficiently reasonable' to be accepted by a
reviewing court."1 45
This is the first opinion in which Chevron was treated as a general
statement of scope-of-review doctrine. This treatment significantly appears
in a case presenting a pure legal question, which is precisely the context in
which a broad reading of Chevron would likely make a difference. The rest
of the majority opinion is filled with multiple references to the
reasonableness of the agency's interpretation. 146 It seems the majority
shifted away from classifying the relevant legal issue combined with a multifactor epistemological deference inquiry toward a facially simpler
"reasonableness" inquiry.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Bazelon and joined by Judges
Tamm and Wilkey, wrote as if Chevron changed nothing. The dissent's only
citation to Chevron was for the proposition that "[t] he judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction."l 47 The only deference
acceptable to the dissent was Skidmore epistemological deference,' 48 under
which "[tlhe EPA rule does not 'receive high marks'" 49 for reasons
presented at the outset of this discussion.
Thus the seeds were planted, but there was a lot of growth to come. The
majority did not expressly say Chevron materially altered prior law, nor did it
elaborate on what any new Chevron framework might entail.
The seeds began to germinate in Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,15o

145. Id. at 1566-67 (alteration in original) (some internal citations omitted).
146. See id. at 1567 ("EPA reasonably mandated"); id. ("agency reasonably required"); id.
at 1568 ("EPA reasonably reads"); id. ("the May 30 rule is not precluded by the statute's
definition of 'useful life"'); id. at 1568 ("a reasonable method"); id. at 1570 ("a reasonable
agency interpretation"); id. at 1571 ("agency therefore may reasonably require").
147. Id. at 1578 n.33 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
148. Id. at 1573-74 (clarifying what deference will be afforded to an agency contextual
interpretation).
149. Id. at 1574 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976)).
150. 744 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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with arguably the first clear application of the "Chevron two-step" in the
lower courts. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)151 required pre-retirement vesting for most employer pension
plans and also provided a federal insurance program, administered by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 152 to guarantee benefits to
retirees if their plans terminated with insufficient assets to cover vested
liabilities. As part of the transition to the new ERISA regime, the statute
specified that to determine the amount of guaranteed retiree benefits, "any
increase in the amount of benefits under a plan resulting from a plan
amendment which was made, or became effective, whichever is later,
within 60 months before the date on which the plan terminates shall be
disregarded." 53 The evident purpose of this "phase-in" section "was to
prevent abuse of the termination insurance program by plan administrators
who might 'balloon' benefits, and thus unfunded plan liabilities, in
anticipation of termination." 54
The PBCG issued a rule defining "benefits increases" to be "not only
increases in the amount of monthly benefits but also 'any change in plan
provisions which advances a participant's ... entitlement to a benefit, such
as liberalized participation requirements or vesting schedules, reductions in
the normal or early retirement age under a plan, and changes in the form
of benefit payments." 5 5 This rule barred consideration of changes in
vesting rules made within five years of plan termination, even when those
vesting rules were mandated by other provisions of ERISA. Plaintiffs were
employees of a company that changed its vesting rules within the five-year
time period and then terminated its plan with insufficient assets. The
PBGC ruled that it could not consider the vesting changes made within the
five-year period, and the plaintiffs appealed.
Rettig presents a classic pure, "ivory tower" question of law: whether the
phrase "increase in the amount of benefits" can include matters such as
changes in vesting rules not directly changing the periodic amounts payable
to retirees. One can ask and answer that question without reference to the
specific facts of any particular case. Under the pre-Chevron regime, such a
pure question of law would be addressed through a de novo standard of
review, absent some special reason to defer to the PBGC.
Instead, the panel opinion authored by Judge Wald (as was the opinion
in General Motors v. Ruckelshaus) and issued on September 11, 1984 laid out
151.
U.S.C.,
152.
153.
154.
155.

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
Id. § 1322(b)(1)(B).
Rettig, 744 F.2d at 137.
Id. at 138.
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the now-familiar Chevron two-step framework:
We are initially confronted with the familiar task of reviewing an agency's
construction of the statute it is charged with implementing, a task which of
course we undertake with due deference to the agency's congressional
mandate and expertise. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As we understand the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncements in Chevron, our inquiry consists of two steps.
First, we must determine whether Congress had a specific intent as to the
meaning of a particular phrase or provision. Id. at 842-43. To do this, we
analyze the language and legislative history of the provision. As the Court
noted in Chevron, "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issue of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary
to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n. 9. Thus, in ascertaining the
congressional intent underlying a specific provision, we are not required to
grant any particular deference to the agency's parsing of statutory language
or its interpretation of legislative history.
However, if that inquiry fails to answer the precise question before us-if
it appears that "Congress did not actually have an intent" regarding the
particular question at issue, id. at 845-then we must seriously consider
whether Congress implicitly delegated to the agency the task of filling the
statutory gap. At this second stage, when policy considerations assume a
prominent role, we must uphold the agency's interpretation if it "represents a
reasonable accommodation of conificting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute." Id. In this case, if we conclude that "Congress
did not actually have an intent" with respect to the phase-in of mandatory
vesting improvements, we are required to grant a considerable degree of
56
deference to the PBGC's reconciliation of competing statutory policies.'
The court then engaged in a lengthy analysis of the statute's language,
purpose, and legislative history, and while it said "we emerge from our
foray into the statute and its history with the indubitable impression that
Congress intended that the PBGC fully guarantee benefits to those
employees meeting the vesting standards," 57 it found itself "unable to
characterize as entirely clear and unambiguous the evidence reviewed here
1 58
The court
of the intent of Congress as to the precise question before us."
thus felt compelled to "proceed to the second stage of our task of statutory
construction, and determine whether the PBGC's interpretation of the
of conflicting
accommodation
reasonable
'a
reflects
statute
15 9
policies . . . committed to the agency's care by the statute."'

Somewhat

156. Id. at 140-41 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
157. Id. at 150.
158. Id.
159.

Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

845 (1984)).
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anticlimactically, the court found the agency's interpretation failed to
account for all the relevant factors, and it remanded the case to the agency
for reconsideration.160
The court surely would have sided with the plaintiffs in the absence of
Chevron,161 so the precise framework employed likely did not affect the
outcome of the case, but the court significantly couched its entire discussion
in terms of what it thought Chevron prescribed. Also, it is significant that the
court moved to step two and deferred to the agency despite believing there
was a best interpretation of the statute. That was not enough to end the
case at step one; the court in some manner understood the search for a
"specific intent" of Congress to require some level of confidence in the
statutory meaning beyond an "indubitable impression." Thus, not only
was the court employing something recognizable as the Chevron framework;
it was starting the long, difficult, and still radically incomplete path toward
making that framework operational. The opinion at least reads as though
Chevron changes the methodology for scope of review of agency legal
conclusions.

C. Two Steps Back
The D.C. Circuit did not rush to embrace the framework set forth by
Judge Wald in GeneralMotors and Rettig. To the contrary, the D.C. Circuit's
early reception to the Chevron two-step was decidedly mixed. On the court's
next occasion to employ Chevron, 162 the majority ignored it entirely.
Middle South Energy, Inc. v. FERC 63 concerned the Federal Power Act. In
1984, the Act required electric utilities subject to Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction to file rate schedules and to
notify FERC of any changes in rates. It crucially provided, "Whenever any
such new [rate] schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority . .. to
enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate .. .; and,
pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission ... may
suspend the operation of such schedule . . . ."164 This provision gave FERC
160. See id. at 155-56 (noting the disposition anticipated the still-vibrant debate of
whether Chevron's second step duplicates, overlaps with, or complements hard look review
under the arbitrary or capricious test of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act).
161. See id. at 152 (exhibiting the court's unwillingness to second-guess informed agency
balancing of interests).
162. Along the way, Chevron was briefly cited, in a case plainly involving law application,
for the general proposition that agencies receive deference subject to the ultimate authority
of courts to pronounce the law. See Coal Exps. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. United States, 745
F.2d 76, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
163. 747 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
164. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1982).
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the authority to suspend changes in rates, pending a hearing. The agency
claimed power under this provision to suspend, pending hearing, original
rates even in the absence of any changes or new filings. The case essentially
came down to whether the phrase "such new schedule" refers only to
schedules changing rates or also to schedules establishing rates in the first
instance. This is a pure question of law, so the agency would not have
received legal deference pre-Chevron. But under the framework set out in
General Motors and Rettig, both of which also involved pure questions of law,
FERC would be entitled to some measure of legal deference regardless of
the classification of the question, and the court should have decided only
whether the Agency's view is reasonable.
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Bork and issued on November
6, 1984, rejected the Agency's position without mention of deference and
without citation to Chevron. The court relied entirely on the statute's
language, legislative history, and the Agency's prior interpretations. 165 This
was not for lack of Chevron awareness: the case was argued on March 8,
1984, well before Chevron was decided, but Judge Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion explicitly invoked Chevron for the proposition that "FERC's current
interpretation merits deferential judicial consideration." 66 Judge Ginsburg
found the reference in the statute to "such new schedule" to be ambiguous
between original schedules and changed schedules, found the statute "bears
the reading FERC now gives it,"167 and would have affirmed the agency on
that point. The majority evidently wanted no part of it.
Chevron was prominent, though not necessarily recognizably, in Montana
v. Clark,168 a case decided on November 20, 1984, after having been argued
on September 25, 1984-making it the first case we discuss argued after
Chevron. A statute provided for allocating funds from mine reclamation "in
any State or Indian reservation ... to that State or Indian reservation."1 69
The Secretary of the Interior construed the statute as though the term
"Indian reservation" meant "Indian lands," with the effect that Indian
tribes could receive funds from reclamation projects on lands in which they
had a beneficial interest, but which were not actually on their reservations.
The State of Montana challenged the Agency's regulation and the D.C.
Circuit affirmed.
The case involved a pure, abstract question of law, as the court (in a rare
recognition of the categorization problem) expressly acknowledged:
165.
166.
U.S.A.
167.
168.
169.

747 F.2dat767-71.
Id. at 774 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Chevron
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-45 (1984)).
Id.
749 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
30 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(2) (1982).
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"Montana raises a pure question of law, whether the challenged regulation
is inconsistent with the organic statute."170 As such, the case brought into
7
focus "two superficially conflicting principles of statutory interpretation." 1
On the one hand, Montana invoked "the principle that the judiciary is
uniquely responsible for the final determination of the meaning of
statutes," 7 2 while the "federal appellees, on the other hand,
acknowledge[d] the purely legal nature of the question but insist[ed] that
of the
[the] court should afford substantial deference to the Department
173
Interior's construction of a statute it is entrusted to administer."
Judge Wright found this conflict "more apparent than real,"1 74 because:
properly understood, deference to an agency's interpretation constitutes a
judicial determination that Congress has delegated the norm-elaboration
function to the agency and that the interpretation falls within the scope of
that delegation. Thus the court exercises its constitutionally prescribed
function as the final arbiter of questions of law when it evaluates the breadth
of congressional delegation and, in so doing, determines the degree of
17
deference warranted in the particular controversy before it." 5
Judge Wright saw Chevron as expressing this principle and prescribing "the
appropriate methodology for ascertaining whether to afford deference to an
agency construction of its governing statute." 7 6 After setting forth the
standard elements of the Chevron two-step framework, however, Judge
Wright explained that determining whether Congress had delegated
interpretative authority to the agency, so that (legal) deference was
warranted, required a multifaceted, statute-specific inquiry:
[W]e must determine whether the agency's construction warrants deference
by measuring the breadth of delegation . ... [] he absence of several of the
typical indicia of broad congressional delegation to the agency counsels
[T]he construction ... required no technical or
against deference ....
specialized expertise .... Similarly, the statutory language at the center of
this controversy is not "of such inherent imprecision . . . that a discretion of

almost legislative scope was necessarily contemplated."
On the other hand, . . . Congress expressly recognized that the
jurisdictional status of Indian lands was too uncertain to permit effective
allocation of regulatory authority for those regions. ... Given this rather
remarkably mixed message, we can only conclude that, pending

170. 749 F.2d at 744.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965)).
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 745.
Id. (internal citation marks omitted).

176.

Id.
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congressional clarification, Congress afforded the Secretary substantial
discretion in the administration of the fund on Indian lands. Thus deference
is appropriate, and we will uphold the agency's interpretation provided only
that it is not expressly foreclosed by congressional intent and that it is
reasonable.' 77
The result seems like an application of the Chevron framework, complete
with a "step-two" affirmance, but with a view of Chevron's scope much
narrower than the view reflected in General Motors and Rettig. Those cases
did not find it necessary to conduct detailed inquiries into whether they
involved the kinds of statutes for which Congress intended deference to
agencies on pure law interpretation. Under pre-Chevron law, one could
conceivably find case-specific reasons to defer to agencies in such
circumstances-de novo review was presumptive, not absolute-but they
were relatively rare. Accordingly, Judge Wright-like Judge Breyer three
months earlier-fit a narrow understanding of Chevron into the preexisting
legal order rather than seeing that Chevron mandated a significant change in
legal practice.
After brief and uninformative appearances in cases involving agency
policy decisions,' 78 and a fairly flagrant agency misconstruction of a
statute,179 Chevron re-emerged in a major way in two decisions issued on
December 5, 1984. Both, again, were authored by Judge Wald.
80
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States Railroad Retirement Board
concerned two related statutes that provided retirement benefits to railroad
8
workers "in the service of one or more employers,"' ' including workers in
foreign countries and non-resident and non-citizen workers, subject to the
proviso that
an individual not a citizen or resident of the United States shall not be
deemed to be in the service of an employer when rendering service outside
the United States to an employer who is required under the laws applicable
in the place where the service is rendered to employ therein, in whole or in
82
part, citizens or residents thereof.'
The Railroad Retirement Board understood a 1978 Canadian

177. Id. at 746 (internal citations omitted).
178. See Walter 0. Boswell Mem'l Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(holding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services's policy interpretation of the
Medicare Act was not arbitrary and capricious).
179. See Am. Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 833-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[TMhe
legislative history is inconsistent with the standardless and open-ended authority to revoke
waivers....").
180. 749 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
181. 45 U.S.C. §( 231(b)(1), 351(d) (1982).
182. Id. §§ 231(d)(3), 351(e).
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immigration regulation to require the hiring of Canadian workers and
accordingly held that the relevant statutes did not cover such workers. The
petitioners, the Railroad Labor Executives' Association (RLEA), appealed.
Everyone agreed the Board should get no deference in the interpretation
of Canadian law.'83 But the Board argued, and the court agreed, that this
case did not simply involve an interpretation of Canadian law. Rather,
RLEA insisted that the statutory word "required" had a strict, firm
meaning of "mandated by law" and that a foreign "require [ment]" not
imposing something like a hiring quota could not serve to activate the
statutory exemption. Those are propositions about the meaning of
American statutes administered by the Board, and they are pure, abstract
legal questions that can be asked and answered outside the context of a
specific controversy. So framed, the case looks like a prime candidate for
the Chevron frameworkJudge Wald set forth in prior opinions.
Judge Wald thought so as well; her opinion set forth and applied the
Chevron two-step analysis. 8 4 She found the statute ambiguous at step one:
"[TMhe plain words contained in the ... exceptions to covered service do
not compel us to adopt any particular meaning. .. [and] nothing in the
legislative history of these provisions gives us any clue as to the meaning
Congress intended."1 85 Accordingly, "Our task in determining the
reasonableness of the Board's decision is not to interpret the statutes as we
think best but only to inquire as to whether the Board's interpretation is
'sufficiently reasonable' to be accepted by a reviewing court."18 6 As
happened in Retti, however, the court found the agency had not sufficiently
considered all relevant factors or adequately explained its statutory
interpretation, and the Board's decision was vacated and remanded.'8 7
Nonetheless, the Chevron framework governed, which makes all the more
puzzling the court's opinion in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. United
States.' 88 Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission involved the Bus Regulatory
Reform Act, which made it easier for bus companies to discontinue
unprofitable routes-mainly serving small towns-by allowing ICC to
override refusals by state regulators to permit the discontinuance of routes.
(Under the prior law, essentially either the state commission or ICC could

183. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 749 F.2d at 860 (noting that the court can independently
reach its own determination of Canadian law since the issues are purely questions of law).
184. See id. (identifying that considerable deference is required under Chevron when an
agency constructs its own governing statutes).
185. Id. at 861.
186. Id. at 862 (quoting FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27,
39(1981)).
187. Id. at 862-64.

188. 749 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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block discontinuance, but either agency could grant it under the new law.)
ICC overrode the state agency on twelve routes, and the state agency
appealed. The governing statute required ICC to consider such matters as
"the public interest" and "an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce,"l 89 so most issues that arose involved either agency
policymaking or, at most, questions of law application. One important
pure question of law, however, slipped through the cracks.
ICC was statutorily required to grant a request for discontinuance of a
route
unless the Commission finds, on the basis of evidence presented by the
person objecting to the granting of such permission, that such discontinuance
or reduction is not consistent with the public interest or that continuing the
transportation, without the proposed discontinuance or reduction, will not
190
constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
ICC granted a request because balancing the public interestcontinuing service but burdening interstate commerce by forcing
continuation of unprofitable service-weighed in favor of granting the
request. The petitioners countered that ICC had to find both the public
interest and economic efficiency would be served by discontinuance, and
could not balance one against the other. That is a pure question of law,
and it seemed ripe for the Chevron framework, which would affirm the
agency's decision unless its interpretation was contrary to the statute's clear
meaning or otherwise unreasonable.
The court briefly mentioned Chevron at several points in its lengthy
opinion,191 but it made no mention of Chevron when discussing what it
92
raised by ICC's
termed the "substantial issues of statutory interpretation"
decision. The court found the statute's legislative history, structure, and
purpose contrary to the Agency's decision.193 In theory, one could treat this
as a finding under Chevron step one that the meaning of the statute was
clear; the many references in the opinion to congressional intent-step
one's touchstone as articulated in the Chevron decision-support this
reading. But by December 1984, one might expect something more
explicit from the court, especially in an opinion written by Judge Wald.
Instead, the discussion in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission could have
been written precisely the same way, in both substance and form, if Chevron

189.
190.
191.
toward
192.
193.

Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 844 (quoting the statutory language).
See id. at 847, 849 (referencing Chevron's two-step framework and judicial deference
agency interpretation).
Id. at 849.
Id. at 851-53.
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(and General Motors and Rettig) had never existed. There was nothing to
suggest that Chevron was relevant to its analysis.
Perhaps most telling of Chevron's status (or lack thereof) as a landmark is
the large number of D.C. Circuit opinions in late 1984 and early 1985
involving agency interpretations of statutes in which Chevron was not
mentioned. Such cases were legion, involving both pure questions of law 94
and questions of law application.' 95 It is hard to say how any of those cases
would have differed had Chevron supplied the analytical framework, but for
our purposes the significance lies simply in the absence of that framework.
It is true that almost all of them were argued before Chevron, and some long
before Chevron,196 but we have seen the court was capable of incorporating
Chevron into the analysis of already-argued cases. Chevron simply was not
seen as important enough to require inclusion. By the end of 1984, the
D.C. Circuit thus was applying the Chevron two-step episodically at best.
Even the judge who birthed the Chevron doctrine was not applying it
consistently.
D. A Tale of Two Readings
1985 was the best of times and the worst of times for supporters of a
broad reading of Chevron. The year began with a series of D.C. Circuit
decisions that seemed to treat Chevron as settled law prescribing the
methodology for review of agency legal determinations, without need for
extended discussion of the point.'97 Those brief treatments raised more
questions than they answered about the mechanics of Chevron, but they
suggest the Chevron framework, however unelaborated, had taken hold. The

194. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 750 F.2d 143 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 749 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ctr. for Auto
Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1984); City of Winnfield v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 744 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1984); E. Ark. Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 742 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
195. See Ass'n of Civilian Technicians, Montana Air Chapter v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 756 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 744
F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 743
F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
196. Six of the cases cited supra notes 194 and 195 were argued in 1983.
197. See FAIC Secs., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Cent.
& S. Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 757 F.2d 301, 314-17 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 756 F.2d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Def. Logistics Agency v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 754 F.2d 1003, 1004, 1013-14
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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same could not be said for decisions by other circuit courts, whose
treatment of Chevron was far more equivocal and considerably less
sophisticated than the D.C. Circuit's, 198 but nevertheless, one can still see in
them outlines of an emerging "Chevron doctrine."
A pair of decisions by Judge Ken Starr did cast considerable doubt on
this picture-notable because Judge Starr is often seen as one of Chevron's
progenitors.1 99 The key decision was American Federation ofLabor & Congress of
Industrial Organizations v. Donovan.200 The details of the case, involving
challenges to eight separate rules implementing various provisions of the
Service Contract Act, are not important here; instead, we focus on the
case's scope of review principles. The Department of Labor urged, and the
district court held, that the Agency's rules should be reviewed under the
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of § 706(2)(A) of the APA.20
Judge Starr, writing for himself, Judge Bork, and Judge Ginsburg, begged
to differ at least in part:
Not all agency determinations, of course, are due an equally high degree of
deference. Agencies are of necessity called upon from time to time to
interpret terms in the statute they are charged with implementing or
enforcing. Ordinarily, such "administrative interpretations of statutory terms
are given important but not controlling significance." "[A] court is not
required to give effect to an interpretative regulation[, but v]arying degrees
of deference are accorded ... based on such factors as the timing and
consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its expertise." In a
word, when an agency interprets a statute, courts employ, in effect, a sliding
scale of deference, taking into account a variety of deference-related factors
such as those enumerated in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). See, e.g.,

198. See Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1985)
(including Chevron in a string citation for deference to agency expertise); Kamp v.
Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Chevron with no discussion while
holding that the EPA "reasonably" interpreted the Clean Air Act); Mattox v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 752 F.2d 116, 123 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding, with little discussion, Chevron to be an
"apt standard" for review of agency decisions); Phila. Gear Corp. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
751 F.2d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1984) (treating Chevron as requiring deference only in the
case of express delegations of interpretative authority). Perhaps the one exception was
Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985), which read Chevron
quite broadly to prescribe the framework for review of at least EPA legal conclusions. See id.
at 1469-70.
199. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment ofAgency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. LJ.
1083, 1087 (2008).
200. 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
201. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982) (instructing courts to strike down agency actions
found "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law").
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NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944); Centerfor Auto
Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 747 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1984).202
This is an elegant statement of pre-Chevron scope of review doctrine.
What about Chevron?
Circumstances do exist, of course, under settled principles of law when an
agency's view of a statute is still to be reviewed under the traditional
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Where Congress delegates, explicitly or
implicitly, to an administrative agency the authority to give meaning to a
statutory term or to promulgate standards or classifications, the regulations
adopted in the exercise of that authority enjoy "legislative effect." See Chevron,
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
As Chevron teaches us, "[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Chevron, supra, at 844.203

The key under this analysis is to figure out when Congress implicitly
delegated interpretative authority to an agency, so that a deferential
approach should govern. Judge Starr addressed that crucial topic in a
footnote:
Under the Supreme Court's decision last Term in Chevron, where Congress
has delegated, either expressly or implicitly, to an agency the authority to
interpret a statutory term, "a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. An implicit
delegation is more difficult to recognize than an explicit delegation.
However, such implicit delegations have been recognized where an
undefined statutory term, such as "extreme hardship," constitutes the
operative standard to guide Executive Branch action, and where the
standard is one "of such inherent imprecision ... that a discretion of almost
legislative scope was necessarily contemplated" ... 20
This discussion limits Chevron essentially to those circumstances identified
by pre-Chevron law as warranting deference: cases in which there are special
circumstances in the statutory scheme prescribing deference, characterized
(against a general background of de novo review for legal questions) by
highly undefined or imprecise statutory language. In Donovan, the court said,
"We have not divined in the matters before us an implicit delegation of
authority to the Secretary," 205 suggesting the court was serious when it
202. 757 F.2d at 340-41 (alterations in original) (some internal citations omitted).
203. Id. at 341 (alteration in original) (some internal citations omitted).
204. Id. at 341 n.7 (some internal citations omitted).
205. Id. The court added that it "need not plumb deeply into those matters inasmuch as
we find in each instance, for reasons to be set forth hereafter, the Secretary's interpretation
to be concordant with the statutory scheme and provisions." Id. No deference was given,
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described a narrow band of cases in which deference would be appropriate.
This analysis for identifying instances in which legal deference is due
agencies on pure questions of law does not differ noticeably from Judge
Breyer's discussion in Mayburg and Judge Wright's discussion in Clark, both
of which folded a very modest interpretation of Chevron into the preexisting
methodology. If anything, Judge Starr's opinion gives a narrower scope to
Chevron than did these other decisions by seemingly imposing a very strict
standard for finding implicit delegations to agencies. If Judge Starr was
Chevron's friend, then in Spring 1985, it needed no enemies.
Four days after Donovan was issued, another opinion authored by Judge
Starr was released.

Community Nutrition Institute v. roung206 concerned

whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) could regulate the level
of aflatoxins allowed in corn through informal "action levels" rather than
formal, specified "tolerances." Under the statute, poisonous or deleterious
food additives-which concededly included aflatoxin in corn-were
generally deemed unsafe and prohibited, "but when such substance is so
required or cannot be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate
regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he
finds necessary for the protection of public health." 207 The petitioners
argued that this provision mandated quantity-based regulations, while the
FDA argued it authorized but did not require them. This is a classic pure
question of law that would seem to require the Chevron framework. The
court briefly cited Chevron, found Congress had directly spoken to the
precise question at issue (i.e., the meaning of the statute was clear), and held
quantitative regulations were required. 208
The case can be understood as a straightforward step-one decision
cleanly within the Chevron framework. That is probably formally right-if a
court really believes the meaning of the statute is clear, there is no occasion
to talk about methodology, reasonableness, deference, or anything else,
because the case is over. 209 Slightly more than a year later, however, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision in Community Nutrition Institute by an

8-1 vote, 210 finding the statute ambiguous and the FDA's interpretation

but no deference was needed in that case to affirm the agency.
206. 757 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
207. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982).
208. See Cmly. Nutrition Inst., 757 F.2d at 357 (rejecting the FDA's statutory interpretation
as "fl[ying] in the teeth of Congress' clear intent").
209.

Such was obviously the case, for example, in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Department

ofEnergy, 778 F.2d I (D.C. Cir, 1985), in which the agency very neatly read out of the statute
an express requirement that power be sold. No elaborate discussion of methodology was
necessary to invalidate the agency decision.
210. Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
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reasonable. (The lone dissenter in the Supreme Court wasJustice Stevens.)
If the D.C. Circuit's decision was an application of Chevron, it was an
uncharitable one.
These decisions, neither of which puts the Chevron framework at center
stage, make more puzzling another opinion from Judge Starr, issued on
April 16, 1985, just weeks after his prior two opinions noted above. In
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. EPA,211 there were several challenges to the
212
EPA's classification of certain sites as issuers of "hazardous substances."
In a footnote at the outset of his analysis, Judge Starr briefly set out the
Chevron framework. 213 Most of the opinion was devoted to what seemed like
a step-one argument in favor of the EPA's interpretation, though the
decision never declared the meaning of the statute clearly supported the
EPA. After considering the various arguments against the EPA's position,
the court noted:
The best case to be made for petitioners, upon analysis, is that when one
examines the statute and the specific part of the legislative history upon
which they rely, it becomes unclear as to what Congress' intent actually was.
However, when Congress' intent is unclear, settled principles of law require
us to determine whether EPA's interpretation is sufficiently reasonable for us
214
to accept that interpretation.
This was a straightforward application of the Chevron two-step as settled law.
Indeed, a companion case to the first Eagle-Picher decision-issued the
same day and decided by the same panel of Judges Starr, Edwards, and
Robinson-reinforced the notion of Chevron as settled law. The second
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. EPA215 concerned a challenge to the
methodology employed by the EPA to construct its Hazardous Ranking
System. The court, in an opinion by Judge Edwards, announced the
Chevron formula, 216 found reasonable the Agency's interpretation of the

211.

759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

212. 42U.S.C.§9601(14)(1982).
213. Judge Starr wrote:
In reviewing the interpretation of a statute by the agency that administers it, a
court must first determine if Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue," and if Congress' intent is clear, the court "must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). If Congress' intent is not
clear, however, the court "must conduct the 'narrower inquiry into whether the
[agency's] construction was "sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing
court."'
See 759 F.2d at 927 n.5 (alteration in original) (some internal citations omitted).
214. Id. at 930.
215. 759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
216. Id. at 920.
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governing statute,2 17 and affirmed the Agency in a very brief discussion.
The evident message of the two Eagle-Picher cases was that Chevron was a
generally applicable doctrine.
By mid- to late-1985, near Chevron's first anniversary, many decisions
across many circuits could be cited for the proposition that the two-step
Chevron framework-which does not mention whether the relevant legal
question was pure or mixed and which does not look for statute-specific
evidence of congressional intent to entrust the agency with interpretative
authority over the former-was simply settled law. 218 This is enough
authority to warrant the recognition of the "Chevron doctrine," but
identifying its contents is no easy feat; the oft-recited two-step framework
both raised and obscured as many questions as it answered. However, one
could minimally and fairly say the distinction between pure and mixed
questions of law had lost much of its bite by 1986. It was now routine, not
exceptional, for courts to grant deference-legal deference not justified by
case-specific factors pertaining to agency expertise-when agencies
interpreted pure questions of law. There was still disagreement over the
precise range of extending deference. Some cases continued to search for
statute-specific evidence of congressional intent to delegate interpretative
authority to the agency, but many just proceeded to the Chevron framework.
There is no rigorously empirical way to verify this claim, but there is good
reason to think the law of judicial review looked very different in 1985 than
in 1975.
There was still enough authority to allow doubt as to whether any major
change in the law had really occurred. Cases often still arose in which the
217. Id.at920-21.
218. See, e.g., FORMULA v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 743, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Emps., v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 778 F.2d 850, 856-58 (D.C. Cir 1985); Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 3090 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751, 754 n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Ohio v. Ruckelshaus, 776 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (6th Cir. 1985); Lugo v.
Schweiker, 776 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (3d Cir. 1985); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference v.
United States, 773 F.2d 1561, 1567 (1lth Cir. 1985); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United
States, Inc. v. EPA, 768 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d
1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1985); Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 767 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985);
Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Simmons v. ICC, 766
F.2d 1177, 1179 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); Trailways Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 766 F.2d 1537, 1542
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. United States, 765 F.2d 329, 341-42 (2d
Cir. 1985); Gen. Elec. Uranium Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 764 F.2d 896, 905
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1288 (1lth Cir. 1985); Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. ICC, 763 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 1985); Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 763
F.2d 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Black v. ICC, 762 F.2d 106, 114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Schwartz v. Gordon, 761 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 1985); Lawrence v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 759 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Chevron framework appeared to play no role.

Transit Union

International v. Donovan219

[65:1

For example, Amalgamated

involved § 13(c) of the Urban Mass

Transportation Act, which provides federal funds to public transit
authorities that take over formerly private transit systems, but only if the
Secretary of Labor certifies the public transit authority has made "fair and
equitable" labor protective arrangements, including specifically "such
provisions as may be necessary for ... the continuation of collective
bargaining rights." 220 The Secretary approved funds for an Atlanta transit
authority, notwithstanding a state law removing important subjects from
collective bargaining, on the ground that the authority's overall labor
package was "fair and equitable."22 1 The unions objected that the "fair and
equitable" determination had to be in addition to, rather than substitutedfor,
the preservation of collective bargaining rights. The D.C. Circuit agreed
with the unions. The court's discussion of the language and legislative
history of the statute is lengthy, 222 detailed, and likely correct. One could
imagine seeing the court declare a union victory at step one of Chevron
because the meaning of the statute was clear. One could not in fact see that
in Amalgamated Transit Union, however, because the court did not mention
Chevron, deference, the clear meaning of the statute, step one, or any related
concept. It simply launched into an analysis of the relevant statute. The
omission of Chevron from this discussion is intriguing because Chevron
appeared in an earlier part of the opinion rejecting the Department's claim
that the relevant inquiry was committed to agency discretion by law. 223
The case is not literally contrary to Chevron because there is no reason
applying the Chevron framework would have changed the result. But it is
striking that the Chevron framework did not merit a mention.
To much the same effect is Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. United States, 224
authored by Judge Bork. The case was part of a long line of decisions,
statutes, and agency rulings dealing with the shipping of recyclable
materials. Railroads had previously been ordered to pay millions of dollars
in refunds to shippers of recyclables based on territorial averages of variable
shipping costs. In the latest iteration, the ICC ordered additional refunds
to individual shippers who could show that the variable costs of shipping
specific materials were below statutory maxima. The railroads claimed that
this would result in double refunds to some customers. The court agreed

219. 767 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
220. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1609(c) (1982).
221.

Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l, 767 F.2d at 941.

222. See id. at 946-50 (stretching across five pages of the Federal Reporter).
223.

See id. at 944 n.7.

224. 768 F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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the ICC ruling was contrary to § 204(e) of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,225
which reads in full:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or any other law, within 90
days after the effective date of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, all rail carriers
providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under
subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title shall take all actions necessary to
reduce and thereafter maintain rates for the transportation of recyclable or
recycled materials, other than recyclable or recycled iron or steel, at revenueto-variable cost ratio levels that are equal to or less than the average revenueto-variable cost ratio that rail carriers would be required to realize, under
honest, economical, and efficient management, in order to cover total
operating expenses, including depreciation and obsolescence, plus a
reasonable and economic profit or return (or both) on capital employed in
the business sufficient to attract and retain capital in amounts adequate to
provide a sound transportation system in the United States. As long as any
such rate equals or exceeds such average revenue-to-variable cost ratio
established by the Commission, such rate shall not be required to bear any
further rate increase. The Commission shall have jurisdiction to issue all
226
orders necessary to enforce the requirements of this subsection.
If it is not obvious to the reader how the ICC's interpretation
contravenes the clear meaning of this statute, the reader is not alone.
There is a plausible argument that the ICC's reading renders irrelevant the
second sentence of the statute, as that sentence assumes that at least some
rates might exceed the average revenue-to-variable cost ratio but still be
lawful (though frozen), while the ICC's actions in this case suggested that all
rates above that ratio were necessarily unlawful. But to foreclose the ICC's
reading on that basis seems strongly contrary to Chevron; after all, as the
ICC argued, perhaps the first sentence merely authorizes the ICC to declare
all such rates unlawful without requiringit to do so, so the second sentence
would have plenty of work to do if the ICC chose not to make such a
declaration.
The court never did explain how its decision fit into the Chevron
framework, because the court never cited or mentioned Chevron. Unlike
Amalgamated Transit Union, this is a case in which employing the Chevron
framework may well have changed the outcome, with its explicit focus on
deferring to the agency absent a clear meaning of the relevant statute.
Judge Starr in dissent certainly thought so.227

225. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
226. Id. §204(e), 94 Stat. at 1905 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10731(e) (1982)).
227. Judge Starr wrote in dissent:
I think even the railroads would admit that Congress did not appear to have an intent
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One more example will make the point. 228 In American Cyanamid Co. v.
Young, 229 the petitioner argued that upon filing a supplemental new animal
drug application, the FDA could consider only the safety and effectiveness
of the marginal changes effected by the supplemental application and could
not revisit the safety and effectiveness of the drug as shown by the original
application. The court rejected this challenge and affirmed the Agency's
action, largely by reference to canons of construction. 230 Chevron did not
provide the framework for analysis and warranted only an unelaborated see
also citation. 231 By the end of 1985, Chevron was thus clearly taking root, but
with serious room for debate about its vitality and ability to survive.
One more thought: Chevron was decided by the Supreme Court in the
middle of 1984, and the story thus far has taken us through 1985. What
did the Supreme Court have to say about Chevron during this period?
Fortunately, the answer to that question (spectacularly little) is wellknown and well-documented, thanks again to Tom Merrill. Professor
Merrill famously tracked the use-or non-use-of Chevron in the Supreme
Court in the half-dozen years after Chevron and showed that through 1990
Chevron was not consistently used by the Court as a framework for reviewing
agency legal determinations. 232 The October 1984 term was particularly
uninformative for lower courts looking for guidance about the scope and
impact of Chevron. There were two decisions that arguably, if briefly and
without discussion, suggested Chevron might prescribe a generally applicable
framework,23 3 but it is fair to say no case elaborated seriously on the Chevron
framework-or even expressly identified something resembling a "Chevron
as to whether only average rates, or some other rate methodology, should be
employed. Under elementary principles, adequately obvious so as to require little
elaboration, when Congress does not express an intent, the court's sole duty is to
determine whether the agency's action in the context of its mission is reasonable; if so,
then the agency's view must be upheld.
See Nofolk & W Ry. Co., 768 F.2d at 382 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
228. A few more could be added. See, e.g., Gen. Med. Co. v. FDA, 770 F.2d 214, 218
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (offering only a throwaway reference to Chevron).
229. 770 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
230. See id. at 1217-18 (deferring to the FDA's interpretation despite being inconsistent
with prior interpretations).
231. Id. at 1217.
232.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969,

980-83 (1992) (finding the Chevron two-step framework to have been applied in only onethird of the cases in which ajustice recognized an issue of agency deference).
233. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985)
(regarding the EPA's interpretation of Clean Water Act provisions); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (again, regarding EPA and the
Clean Water Act).
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framework" as a distinct legal entity. Chevron simply was not a major
presence on the Supreme Court in the October 1984 term.
This is not an altogether surprising result. Chevron's broad impact, if any,
was on administrative law, and the Supreme Court circa 1985 was neither
interested nor versed in the subject. Of the nine Justices at that time, 234
none could be said to have any special expertise or interest in
Only one Justice-Warren Burger-had prior
administrative law. 235
experience on the D.C. Circuit, with regular exposure to administrative law
issues, and it is no great slap at him to note that he has never been regarded
as a giant in the field. 236 The impact of Chevron on scope of review doctrine
simply is not something to which one would expect the Supreme Court of
1985 to give much thought.
Through 1985, whatever was happening with Chevron was happening
entirely in the lower courts. And something, however hard to define, was
happening.
IV. COCONUTS DON'T MIGRATE ... BUT DOCTRINES MIGHT
In a series of (unconnected) law review articles in 1986, judges on the
D.C. Circuit described Chevron as a "landmark,"23 7 a "far-reaching
development," 238 and a "watershed." 239 Whatever Chevron stood for, by this
time it had reached a noteworthy level of ascendancy in the lower courts.
One could still find cases that downplayed it,240 but they were becoming
harder to find. It was much easier to find decisions reciting the "familiar
two-step framework set forth in Chevron," 24 1 Chevron's "now familiar
framework for analyzing interpretations of statutes by agencies charged

234. In order of seniority, they were: William Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood
Marshall, Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, John Paul
Stevens, and Sandra Day O'Connor.
235. This is in stark contrast with the current Court, which includes three former
administrative law professors (Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Scalia) and a former chairman of
a federal administrative agency (Justice Thomas).
236. The current Court has four former D.C. Circuit judges (ChiefJustice Roberts, and
Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas).
237. Antonin Scalia, The Role oftthe Judiciar in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 191, 19394(1986).
238. AbnerJ. Mikva, Speech, How Should the Courts TreatAdministrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U.
L. REv. 1, 6 (1986).
239. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283,
283-84 (1986).
240. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 1738 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 806
F.2d 1105, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding, seemingly grudgingly, that Chevron entitles
agency decisions to "some deference," but otherwise ignoring the decision).
241. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 1423, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

60

ADMINISTRATIVE

LA wREVIEW

[65:1

with their administration," 242 and the "now familiar dictates of Chevron."243
We are unable to identify precisely when the dam burst, but by Chevron's
two-year anniversary, it had become the dominant methodology in the
lower courts for review of agency legal determinations. 244
If the Chevron framework really was supplanting the old regime for
judicial review of agency legal determinations, there would be
consequences. The extent of those consequences depended on what the
"Chevron framework" prescribed, which was profoundly unclear in 1986.
The Chevron framework has an air of simplicity. No need to think about
whether the question of law is pure or mixed, whether the statute clearly
delegates authority to the agency, or how to apply the "sliding scale of
deference, taking into account a variety of deference-related factors," 245 all
of which dominated pre-Chevron law. One arguably need only ask whether
the agency administers the statute, and a measure of legal deference flowed
automatically. That deference was not absolute, of course--step one made
that clear. But Chevron did potentially hold out the promise of a simpler,
easier-to-administer scope of review doctrine. For lower courts that had
openly complained for years in the pages of the Federal Reporters that the
Supreme Court had not given them a clear scope of review doctrine,
Chevron offered possible reprieve from the darkness.
Whether Chevron actually, or could have, delivered on that promise of
simplification is another question. It depends on how simple one makes the
Chevron framework. If Chevron's application required a detailed, statute-bystatute analysis of whether Congress intended the agency to have primary
interpretative authority, as some cases held, Chevron would be of little
consequence. If figuring out whether a statute's meaning is "clear" were no
easier (and perhaps harder) than figuring out whether a question of law
were pure or mixed, Chevron could make the courts' job harder rather than
easier. And if the degree of agency deference continued to slide along
many factors with or without Chevron, the marginal gain from the Chevron
framework could be very small. None of these questions had answers in
242. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
243. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
244. A full string citation of cases from this period that treat Chevron as settled law would
get tedious even by the standards of string citations. See, e.g., Kean v. Heckler, 799 F.2d 895,
899 (3d Cir. 1986); Prod. Workers Union of Chi. & Vicinity, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d
323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Dep't of Transp., 791 F.2d
202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Coal. to Pres. the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 907-08 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Humane Soc'y of the United States v. EPA, 790
F.2d 106, 115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Reckitt & Colman, Ltd. v. DEA, 788 F.2d 22, 25-26
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1986).
245. Am. Fed'n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 341
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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1986, nor were courts even openly asking those questions. They would
typically recite the Chevron framework and then proceed with little inquiry
into the methodology's foundations or mechanics. The fullest treatment of
Chevron's methodology came in a case in which Chevron probably did not
make a difference because the case involved a mixed question of law
application. 246 The Chevron two-step was something of a black box-which
perhaps helps to explain its success, as judges could pour into the still
skeletal framework a wide range of preferences and predilections.
At least two other important consequences of Chevron were difficult to
avoid and too plain to ignore. One was pointed out as early as 1984 by
Judge Breyer: 24 7 To the extent Chevron increases the range of circumstances
in which judges defer to agencies on pure legal questions, it seems to reverse
the common-sense view of comparative institutional competence in which
courts are generally better at determining the law and agencies are
generally better at finding facts and making policy. Anyone who subscribes
to the legal process approach, in which decisional authority should be
allocated where best applied, will find a broad reading of Chevron
troublesome at best and absurd at worst. Given the number ofjudges (and
law clerks) trained either at Harvard Law School or by professors who were
trained at Harvard Law School, where the legal process approach grew and
flourished, it would not be surprising to find serious resistance to the Chevron
revolution.
A second consequence was noted by Judge Wald in a 1987 article: "A
broad reading of Chevron, of course, tilts strongly in the direction of the
executive."2 48 The more Chevron mandates deference, the more power flows
from the judiciary to the executive. For those who place faith in the courts
as the primary engine of justice, that is unwelcome. And in the mid- to
late-1980s, the executive to whom power flowed was, and was widely
expected to be in the future, a Republican executive. To be absolutely clear,
the pro and con Chevron forces did not align along classic party lines. It is a
fair guess thatJudge Wald did not vote for Ronald Reagan, and it would be
difficult to find a D.C. Circuit judge whose opinions showed less enthusiasm
One of Chevron's earliest academic
for Chevron than Robert Bork.
249
who no one would mistake for a
Pierce,
Richard
was
champions
246. See Conover, 790 F.2d at 931-36 (involving whether collective IRA trusts are
"securities").
247. See supra pages 34-39 (discussing Judge Breyer's analyses in Mayburg and New

England Telephone).
248.

Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 727

(1987).
249. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftennath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988) (noting the progression in
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conservative shill, and one of the most trenchant critiques of Chevron came
from Tom Merrill. 250 Nonetheless, one need not have been a right-leaning
law clerk in Chevron's formative era (though, as one of this Article's authors
can attest, it certainly does not hurt for this purpose) to appreciate how
difficult it is to overestimate the importance of that particular partisan
perception, especially among the behind-the-scenes law clerks who often
drafted the opinions. This was in the era of the "electoral lock," 251 when
California was a reliably republican state and the Carter presidency was
seen as a post-Watergate blip. President Clinton was not even a gleam in a
pollster's eye. Battles over Chevron were battles over power, and it seemed
obvious at the time to whom the power was going. Some kind of face-off
about the future of Chevron was almost inevitable.
A.

Enter the Dragon

The story of Chevron has so far been almost exclusively that of the D.C.
Circuit. But as the Chevron doctrine gained steam, and its consequences for
allocating decisionmaking power became increasingly apparent, opposition
began to build-and for reasons that did not need to involve the relative
virtues and vices of strengthening Reagan Administration agencies. One
need not be a devotee of the legal process school to recognize there is
something odd about courts routinely deferring to agencies on legal
interpretation-what were the appellate judges getting paid to do if not
decide questions of law, for which they, not the agencies, are supposedly the
experts? 252 Moreover, there is little evidence of this in reported judicial
decisions, but as courts acquired more experience with the Chevron
framework, the many unanswered questions about its mechanics (how clear
is clear? how reasonable is reasonable? is deference now an all-or-nothing
proposition?) were bound to loom larger. The more one thinks about those

administrative law due to Chevron); Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Role of Constitutionaland Political
Theog in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 486-88 (1985) (advocating that EPA's
interpretation was well within the confines ofits congressionally bestowed power).
250. See Merrill, supra note 232, at 1032-33 (contending that Chevron has all the markings
of a failure and a better solution could have been advanced).
251. The "electoral lock" or "electoral college lock" was a colloquial phrase for the
supposed advantage of Republicans in the electoral college as a result of their wide
geographical dominance.
Thomas Brunell & Bernard Grofman, The 1992 and 1996
PresidentialElections: Whatever Happened to the Republican Electoral College Lock?, 27 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 134, 134 (1997). The facts did not necessarily fit the theory, see id. at 135; I.M.
Destler, The Myth of the "Electoral Lock", 29 POL. ScL & POL. 491 (1996), but the theory was
widely held.
252. See Mikva, supra note 237, at 8 (noting that judges are better at "construing statutes"
but that Chevron and its progeny deny and undermine their knowledge).
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questions, the more complex the facially simple Chevron two-step framework
becomes. Maybe the uncertain but fluid pre-Chevron law was not so bad
after all.
Law clerks on the D.C. Circuit who dealt with Chevron daily, if not
hourly, were awash in these controversies. As many of those law clerks
moved to the Supreme Court, they took those still-unresolved controversies
with them.
They also had company: on September 26, 1986, Antonin Scalia
became an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Scalia actually had very little to do with the Chevron doctrine's genesis while
he was on the D.C. Circuit, but he brought interest and expertise in
administrative law to the Supreme Court, along with a firsthand
understanding of the significance of various interpretations of Chevron. The
combination ofJustice Scalia and a crop of law clerks with Chevron on the
brain all but assured that the Supreme Court of 1987 would have
253
something to say.
The initial battle was fought in an unlikely context. Section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act provided in 1982 that "[t]he Attorney
General shall not deport or return any alien ... [with some exceptions not
relevant here] to a country if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatenedin such country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 254 If the otherwise-deportable alien could show he or she "would
be threatened" in their country of return, which the Supreme Court
construed to mean "more likely than not that the alien would be subject to
persecution"2 55 upon return, the Attorney General-typically acting
through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)-was required to
withhold deportation ("shall not deport"). Alternatively, the Refugee Act
allowed the Attorney General, in his or her discretion, to grant asylum to a
refugee, 256 defined as a person "unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
[person's home] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
257
particular social group, or political opinion."

253. Tom Merrill has termed this explanation for the rise of awareness of Chevron in the
Supreme Court the "reverse-migration hypothesis." Merrill, supra note I 15, at 188.
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
255. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
256. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) ("The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an
alien ... and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General.").
257. Id. § 1101(a)(42) (emphasis added).
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In LNS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,258 the government argued the standard of proof
for establishing refugee status, via a showing of a "well-founded fear of
persecution," was the same "more likely than not" standard governing
proof of entitlement to a withholding of deportation under the Immigration
and Nationality Act.259 The respondent argued one could have a "wellfounded fear of persecution" even if such persecution was not "more likely
than not" to occur 260-meaning a forty-nine percent chance of
imprisonment or execution upon return to one's home country is enough to
ground a "well-founded fear." The case thus revolved around a pure
question of law: whether the legislatively prescribed standards of proof
under two different statutes were the same.
The Ninth Circuit had agreed with respondent that the standard for
proving a "well-founded fear" was different, and more generous to the
alien, than was the standard for showing that life or freedom "would be
threatened" 26 ' upon return. The court made no reference to Chevron or
deference to the INS, as prior circuit precedent controlled the case
instead. 262
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government briefly but forcefully
urged deference to the INS's views, though Chevron was only one of many
cases cited and received no special attention. 263 The brief concentrated on
statutory analysis and administrative policy. The respondent's brief argued,
citing Chevron in a footnote, that deference to the INS was appropriate only
when Congress specifically delegates interpretative authority, as had
arguably occurred in some prior immigration cases, 264 and that § 208(a) of
the Refugee Act delegates no such authority. 265 The discussion of
deference was brief, and Chevron was decidedly in the background. The
government's reply brief did not cite Chevron.266
The oral argument, held on October 7, 1986, raised the stakes. The
258. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
259. Id. at 423.
260. Id. at 425.
261. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985).
262. See id. at 1451-52 (citing cases from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, but not
Chevron).
263. See Brief for the Petitioner at 18-19, Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (No. 85782), 1986 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 367. The string citation on page 18 was the briefs only
mention of Chevron.
264. See, e.g., INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (arguing that the Attorney General
has "the authority to construe 'extreme hardship"' if he or she chooses to do so).
265. See Brief of Respondent at 38-39, 39 n.32, Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (No. 85782), 1986 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 362.
266. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (No. 85-782), 1986
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 596.
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government (through long-time Deputy Solicitor General Larry Wallace)
opened its argument calling for deference to the INS, but intriguingly did
not cite, invoke, or otherwise mention Chevron. The deference argument
instead focused on the INS's expertise as "an active participant in the
legislation as it developed," 267 and its opportunity to "study the legislative
background against the experience that it has had in applying the
standards."268 This was consistent with the position in the government's
brief, which easily could have been written without any mention of Chevron.
Chevron was introduced into the oral argument in a question addressed to
Dana Marks Keener, counsel for the respondent, who (perhaps ironically)
later became an immigration judge. The first words out of Ms. Keener's
mouth after "may it please the Court" were:
Understandably, the Government is putting considerable emphasis on their
deference argument. That's because it's the only argument that it has.
Unfortunately, there are some-or fortunately for our side-there are some
considerable problems with deference to the agency in this particular
context.
By reviewing the statutory canons that apply to deference, the first place
you start is with the fact that a court is the expert in terms of statutory
construction. The meaning of the "well-founded fear" standard is an issue of
law. It's clearly within the traditional function of this Court to interpret. It is
not an area ...

269

At that point, Ms. Keener was interrupted by a question from Chief
Justice Rehnquist: "Are you suggesting that the INS in this case should be
270
given no deference simply because it is construing a term of the statute?"
Her response included the argument's first mention of Chevron: "No. Of
course the Court also looks at other factors, and deference cases talk about
27 1
That
the fact, Chevron for example, that first always is Congress' intent."
narrow view of Chevron incited an exchange that, for the first time in the
Cardoza-Fonseca litigation, and indeed for the first time in quite a while in
federal courts, brought to the fore the traditional, pre-Chevron distinction
between pure and mixed questions of law:

267. Transcript of Oral Argument, Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (No. 85-782), 1986
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 30, at *8.
268. Id.
269. Id.at*18.
270. Id. at *19.
271. Id.
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QUESTION (from Chief Justice Rehnquist): Well, my question to you
was, which I don't think you've yet answered, is [] the agency entitled to no
deference because what it is construing is a term of the statute?
MS. KEENER: I think that answer is probably correct. But in arriving at
whether deference is considered or not, the courts usually look at several
factors, which include the legislative history, the plain language of the statute.
QUESTION (from Chief Justice Rehnquist): Well, is deference one of
those factors or not?
MS. KEENER: Well, it can be if a standard is not a question of pure law,
if it is an application of the law to a specific set of facts. And courts often
look to the agency's expertise to decide whether or not that's the kind of
situation presented. However, that's not the case here.
QUESTION (from Justice Scalia): What was Chevron? Wasn't that a
question of pure law? And didn't we say there that we, and in other cases,
that we will accept the expert agency's interpretation of its governing statute
where it's a reasonable one?
MS. KEENER: There was a technical gap in Chevron, and it was involved
in the implementation.
So it was construing a term involved in
implementing a standard.27 2
And with that the game was on.
By a vote of 6-3 (with Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and White dissenting),
the Court agreed with respondent and the Ninth Circuit that the agency
could not permissibly read the "well-founded fear" criterion in the
discretionary withholding-of-deportation provision of the Refugee Act to
require the same "more likely than not" standard of proof required by the
"would be threatened" criterion in the mandatory withholding-ofdeportation provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. So framed,
the decision's holding is an unexceptional and perhaps obviously correct bit
of statutory interpretation. The fireworks were in the dicta.
As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, once one concludedas had the Court-that the statute's plain meaning foreclosed the
government's interpretation, there was no occasion to discuss deference,
Chevron, or anything else. No amount of deference can justify an agency
position contrary to the clear meaning of a statute. Nonetheless, in an
opinion authored by Justice Stevens-who not at all coincidentally
authored Chevron-a clean majority of five Justices took the occasion to
explicitly and pointedly comment on the Chevron framework:
The INS's second principal argument in support of the proposition that
the "well founded fear" and "clear probability" standard are equivalent is
that the BIA so construes the two standards. The INS argues that the BIA's
272.

Id.at*19-*20.
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construction of the Refugee Act of 1980 is entitled to substantial deference,
even if we conclude that the Court of Appeals' reading of the statutes is more
in keeping with Congress' intent. This argument is unpersuasive.
The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be
identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide.
Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that
Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical. In Chevron, US.A.,
Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we explained:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect. Id., at
843, n. 9.
The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of
course, quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each
case in which the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a
particular set of facts. There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like
"well-founded fear" which can only be given concrete meaning through a
process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling 'any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,"' the courts must respect the
interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the
responsibility for administering the statutory program. See Chevron, supra, at
843. But our task today is much narrower, and is well within the province of
the Judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how
the "well-founded fear" test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that
the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the two
standards are identical.273
The implications of this passage in 1987 were potentially enormous.
Justice Stevens, writing for five Justices all of whom were part of the Chevron
majority, effectively announced that the pre-Chevron distinction between
pure and mixed questions of law still governed, which essentially adopted
the position of Cardoza-Fonseca's counsel that the interpretation in Chevron
partook more of law application than of law interpretation. The issue in
Cardoza-Fonseca itself was characterized as "a pure question of statutory
construction for the courts to decide." Any doubt justice Stevens was taking
specific aim at the emergent Chevron doctrine evaporates with a long
footnote that we omitted from the quoted passage. Justice Stevens
pointedly introduced the footnote by observing, "In view of the INS's heavy
reliance on the principle of deference as described in Chevron... , we set
273. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445-48 (footnotes and some internal citations omitted)
(brackets in original).
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forth the relevant text in its entirety" 274-fo0lowed by four full paragraphs
from the Chevron decision.2 75 The wording of this sentence was not
accidental. The INS did not rely on Chevron itself, as we have seen and as
Justice Stevens surely knew. The footnote refers to the "principle of
deference as described in Chevron," meaningJustice Stevens was clarifying the
"principle of deference" that he, speaking for a unanimous Court, intended
to prescribe in 1984. The fourth of the full paragraphs quoted from the
Chevron opinion begins with the words, "[i]n light of these well-settled
principles," indicating Chevron was applying settled law rather than setting
forth any new conception of deference. The message to the lower courts
that had fashioned-however sketchily-their own distinctive "Chevron
doctrine" was clear: there is no "Chevron doctrine" beyond the principles
that were "well-settled" in summer 1984, which required distinguishing
between pure questions of law and mixed questions of law application.
The message was not lost on Justice Scalia. He agreed with the majority
that the government's interpretation of the statute was unsustainable, and
therefore concurred in the result, but he emphatically objected to the
majority's characterization of Chevron:
This Court has consistently interpreted Chevron-which has been an
extremely important and frequently cited opinion, not only in this Court but
in the Courts of Appeals-as holding that courts must give effect to a
reasonable agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is
inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent. The Court's
discussion is flatly inconsistent with this well-established interpretation....
The Court ... implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a
statute for that of an agency whenever they face "a pure question of statutory
construction for the courts to decide," rather than a "question of
interpretation [in which] the agency is required to apply [a legal standard] to
a particular set of facts." No support is adduced for this proposition, which is
contradicted by the case the Court purports to be interpreting, since in
Chevron the Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's
abstract interpretation of the phrase "stationary source."
In my view, the Court badly misinterprets Chevron. More fundamentally,
however, I neither share nor understand the Court's eagerness to refashion
important principles of administrative law in a case in which such questions
are completely unnecessary to the decision and have not been fully briefed by
the parties.276
Presumably, Justice Scalia was not telling Justice Stevens the latter
misunderstood his own opinion. As the reference to Chevron's prevalence in
274.
275.

Id. at 445 n.29.
See id.

276. Id. at 454-55 (Scalia,J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
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the lower courts illustrates, Justice Scalia instead was no doubt identifying
that Chevron had taken on a life of its own, whether Justice Stevens so
intended it in 1984; and to seek casually to alter or undo that structureespecially in a case in which no party was calling for a reconsideration or
clarification of Chevron-could have serious doctrinal consequences.
The three
No Justice joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion.
dissenting Justices found the agency's interpretation of the statute
reasonable, but they did not engage in debate over the proper meaning of

Chevron.
Was the Chevron revolution over before it actually began?
A substantial number of lower courts thought so, quite reasonably given
the strong dictum of Cardoza-Fonseca. There was a surge of decisions in the
courts of appeals announcing that deference-or at least legal deferencewould no longer be given to agency decisions involving pure questions of
277
Not every
law but only to agency applications of law to particular facts.
278
and
revolution,
Chevron
the
short
cut
to
case understood Cardoza-Fonseca
because the discussion in Cardoza-Fonsecawas plainly dictum, there was no
requirement that it be so understood, but there were enough decisions
cutting down on Chevron to question Chevron's future.

B. Exit the Dragon, Enter the Tiger
The stage was set for what promised to be one of the most profound
battles over administrative law doctrine in American legal history. The
lower courts, on their own accord, had constructed a method for reviewing
agency legal conclusions that, however uncertain at the margins and in the
mechanics, was materially different from what preceded it. That method
flew in the face of strongly and widely held precepts about sound allocation
of institutional authority, but it offered some promise of a cleaner, simpler,
and less intrusive judicial role in administrative review. There was ample
room, and strong ammunition, on both sides of that divide. Once the issues
raised by Chevron had migrated to the Supreme Court-which had
happened by the time Cardoza-Fonseca was decided-it seemed inevitable
that those issues would come to a head in something other than an
277. See, e.g., NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1987); FEC v.
Sailors' Union of the Pac. Political Fund, 828 F.2d 502, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1987); Union of
Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Regular Common
Carrier Conference v. United States, 820 F.2d 1323, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams House
Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F.2d 587, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1987); Int'l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 764-65 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
278. See, e.g., Grinspoon v. DEA, 828 F.2d 881, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
Cardoza-Fonsecain fact reaffirmed Chevron).
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exchange of dictum.
It certainly did not look good for Justice Scalia and other defenders of
some version of the Chevron revolution. For one thing, as of 1987 there was
still no clear, universally held conception about what Chevron entailed.
Justice Scalia, in his Cardoza-Fonseca concurrence, thought it was an
"evisceration of Chevron"279 to say courts should rule against agencies
whenever "traditional tools of statutory construction" 280 yield an answer.
This reflects an implicit view about the meaning of Chevron's first step, in
which courts do not defer when the meaning of the statute is clear, but not
necessarily a view that all other proponents of some version of Chevron
would share. What does it mean to say a statute's meaning is "clear"?
There was no answer to be found in the case law in 1987, andJustice Scalia
did not offer one. Nor had the lower courts made progress on the other
issues surrounding Chevron's application. There were many cases applying
the Chevron framework, but no cases explaining clearly what was being
applied. It was hard to rally the troops around something as ephemeral as
the Chevron doctrine. There also did not appear to be very many troops to
rally. No Justice joined Justice Scalia in Cardoza-Fonseca. For all the world
could see, he was the only person on the Supreme Court who was at all
worried about revival of distinguishing between pure and mixed questions
of law in administrative review. As it happened, there were some
important things the world could not see.
In 1987, Justice Scalia was the only vote on the Supreme Court for the
proposition that courts should routinely give some measure of legal
deference to agencies even on pure questions of law interpretation. By
1988, the number had risen to four, with no change in the Court's
membership other than the retirement ofJustice Powell, who had not taken
sides in the Cardoza-Fonsecacontroversy. JNLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 23281 concerned "whether a federal court has authority
to review a decision of the National Labor Relations Board's General
Counsel dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint pursuant to an
informal settlement in which the charging party refused to join." 282 A
unanimous Court of eight Justices-this was during the interregnum before
Justice Kennedy became an active member-found the courts had no such
authority. The case came down to whether the proceeding at issue was
prosecutorial (not reviewable) or adjudicatory (reviewable). The Court's
discussion of the scope of review for this question intriguingly invoked

279.
280.
281.
282.

480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia,J., concurring).
Id.
484 U.S. 112 (1987).
Id. at I14.
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Cardoza-Fonseca but made no specific mention of distinguishing between
pure and mixed questions of law. The Court's disposition on the merits
observed:
[T]he general congressional framework, dividing the final authority of the
General Counsel and the Board along a prosecutorial and adjudicatory line,
is easy to discern. Some agency decisions can be said with certainty to fall on
one side or the other of this line. For example, as already discussed, decisions
whether to file a complaint are prosecutorial. In contrast, the resolution of
contested unfair labor practice cases is adjudicatory. But between these
extremes are cases that might fairly be said to fall on either side of the
division. Our task, under Cardoza-Fonseca and Chevron, is not judicially to
categorize each agency determination, but rather to decide whether the
283
agency's regulatory placement is permissible.
Justice Scalia highlighted the Court's deferential posture in a concurrmng
opinion, this time joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices White and
O'Connor:
I join the Court's opinion, and write separately only to note that our decision
demonstrates the continuing and unchanged vitality of the test for judicial
review of agency determinations of law set forth in Chevron.... Some courts
have mistakenly concluded otherwise, on the basis of dicta in LNS v. CardozaFonseca.... If the dicta of Cardoza-Fonseca, as opposed to its expressed
adherence to Chevron, were to be applied here, surely the question whether
dismissal of complaints requires Board approval and thus qualifies for judicial
review ... would be "a pure question of statutory construction" rather than
the application of a "standar[d] to a particular set of facts," as to which "the
courts must respect the interpretation of the agency[.]" Were we to follow
those dicta, therefore, we would be deciding this issue conclusively and
authoritatively, rather than merely "decid[ing] whether the agency's
regulatory placement is permissible[.]" The same would be true, moreover,
of the many other decisions alluded to by the Court in which "we have
traditionally accorded the Board deference with regard to its interpretation of
the NLRA." Those cases, and this, are decided correctly only because "the
statute is silent or ambiguous" with respect to an issue relevant to the
agency's administration of the law committed to its charge-which is the test
for deference set forth in Chevron. 284
The Court's opinion made no response to this concurrence. A response
was certainly available: by describing the decision in terms of line drawing,
the Court left open an ability to challenge Justice Scalia's characterization
of the case as involving a pure question of law. Line drawing smacks of law
application, so it would be possible to slot United Food into the circumstances

283. Id. at 125.
284. Id. at 133-34 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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in which deference was permitted by Cardoza-Fonseca. The Court made no
such effort.
If one enjoyed reading tea leaves, by 1988 it looked as though there
might be a 4-4 split on the Court concerning applying deference to pure
questions of law, awaiting resolution by Justice Kennedy when he joined
the Court. One needed only reasonably assume Justices Stevens, Brennan
(who authored the opinion in United Food), Marshall, and Blackmun
continued to adhere to the strong dictum of Cardoza-Fonseca. It remained
only for the fully staffed Court to decide a case that squarely, neatly, and
cleanly settled the status ofJustice Stevens's dictum in Cardoza-Fonseca.
It never happened. No such decision came-or has come since.
Through a process that we can observe but do not purport to explain, the
4-4 split in United Foodwas almost universally taken by the lower courts as a
vindication of Justice Scalia's position in his concurrence, that Chevron
would extend deference to agency determinations involving pure legal
questions. 285 Litigants were still pushing, albeit unsuccessfully, the
distinction between pure and mixed legal questions as late as 1991 28 6 -and
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, continued to fight the fight well
into the 21st century.287 But at least some form of the Chevron revolution
has dominated the lower courts for more than two decades now. As for the
Supreme Court: following United Food, the law-application/lawdetermination dichotomy essentially vanished from the scene, to be oddly
resurrected by Justice Stevens-perhaps as something of a swan song-in
2009.288 Over the past quarter-century, Cardoza-Fonsecahas been cited by
285. See, e.g., City of Boston v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 898 F.2d 828, 831
(1st Cir. 1990); CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Edwards,J., dissenting) (expressing dislike for Chevron but conceding it governs); Theodus v.
McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380, 1382-84 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. U.S.
R.R. Ret. Bd., 842 F.2d 466, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622,
631-32 (9th Cir. 1988); Mead Johnson Pharm. Grp. v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1332, 1335-36
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Cablevision Syss. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 836 F.2d 599,
607 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
286. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (clarifying that
even the Seventh Circuit, which had afforded a lesser degree of deference to agencies on
purely legal issues in one case, had since retreated); Cent. States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc.
v. ICC, 924 F.2d 1099, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting plaintiffs argument for less agency
deference when jurisdictional issues are purely legal rather than a legal analysis of facts).
287. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531, 534, 538 (2009) (Stevens, J., joined by
Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Fourth Circuit, in Barahona v.
Holder, distinguished an issue on the merits of immigration law and upheld the analysis from
fNegusie "under the familiar Chevron standard." Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 354 (4th
Cir. 2012).
288. See id. (explaining the distinction as being "more faithful to the rationale" of
Chevron).
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the Court almost entirely in immigration cases or for very broad principles
of statutory interpretation, aside from one backhanded reference intimating
a potential distinction between pure and mixed legal questions.289 The
great debate over Chevron's soul thus ended with nary a whimper, much less
a bang.
V. So WHAT?
The debate is effectively settled whether deference is generally due to
agency legal interpretations even regarding pure or abstract legal questions,

but Chevron continues to be a contentious subject across a wide range of
other issues for which the resolutions are much less likely, clear, or both.
We still do not know what it means for a statute to be "clear". 290 (That is
not altogether surprising, for we still do not have consensus on what it

means to talk about the meaning of a statute, clear or otherwise). Step two
of Chevron remains a mystery, beyond the observation that agencies usually
win when they get to it. Reconciling Chevron deference with prior judicial
interpretations of statutes has plagued Chevron from an early time, 291 and it

continues to splinter the Court today. 292 Figuring out to which agency
interpretations the Chevron framework applies has produced a doctrine so

perplexing that lower courts labor to avoid dealing with it.293 One could
easily fill an entire article simply listing, much less trying to resolve, the
many important operational questions that still swirl about Chevron.
289. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) ("[W]e recognized in
Cardoza-Fonseca... that the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous
statutory terms 'concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication."').
290. Compare Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 38 (1990) (suggesting that
the meaning is clear when a particular interpretation is supported by very strong evidence),
with Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1991) (suggesting that the
meaning is clear when it emerges fairly obviously).
291. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1134-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (referencing the conflicting precedent regarding agency
deference).
292. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842-44
(2012) (rejecting petitioner's proposed argument that as an alternative to Chevron deference,
courts may adopt their prior construction of an unambiguous statutory term to trump an
agency's new construction of the same term); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (acknowledging the lower court had incorrectly
applied a different framework than that of Chevron).
293. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240-43 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the Court further complicated Chevron by construing it to effectually
implement "th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead
Has Muddled JudicialReview of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1464 (2005) (positing
Mead and Barnhartv. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), as offering two alternatives for interpreting
Chevron, with courts left to choose between the two).
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The history we have spun yields an important consequence for modem
attempts to wrestle with these questions: parsing the prose of the Chevron
decision for answers is a terrible idea. The Chevron decision did not spawn
the Chevron doctrine, so there is no reason to expect it to clarify it. It would
likely descend down very unproductive paths-as arguably happened with
formulating the Chevron inquiry as a two-step approach (because that is how
Justice Stevens wrote it in Chevron) rather than as a unitary, one-step inquiry
into the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation (as common sense
would dictate).294 The fewer references to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. .Natural

ResourcesDefense Council Inc., the better.
If one should not read the Chevron decision to find the Chevron doctrine's
proper mechanics, what decision should one read? There is no answer.
The Chevron doctrine grew, and continues to grow, organically over a series
of decisions, none systematically addressing the fundamental issues at its
core. Even read as a whole, the corpus of decisions fails to come to
conform or answer many important questions. For example, Professor
Lawson has been waiting for almost thirty years for a court to openly
acknowledge there is some uncertainty about how to determine the "clear"
meaning of a statute-and he is still waiting patiently. If the post-CardozaFonseca battle had come to a real head, we might have seen some decisions
clarifying-for good or il 295-some of the fundamental issues surrounding
Chevron. But the process by which the Chevron framework insinuated itself
into the law effectively guaranteed a search for canonical decisions would
fail.
What about reference to the underlying goals and purposes of Chevron?
That would be effective if there were consensus about those goals and
purposes, but there is not. What is the Chevron doctrine trying to
accomplish? Is it trying to make the best guess about congressional intent
regarding allocation of interpretative authority?296 Is it reflecting that, in a
post-delegation-doctrine world, most inquiries that look like statutory
interpretation are really policy determinations? 297 Is it about making
294. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009) (proposing
that an agency's reasonable interpretation can prevail without requiring the Court to inquire
whether Congress had directly spoken to the contested issue).
295. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (refuting as not actually a step
forward the majority's clarification of when agency interpretations fit within the framework
of Chevron); see also Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 295
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (labeling Mead Corp.'s
complication of the Chevron framework application as an "irrational fillip").
296. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454-55 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court frequently misinterprets Chevron).
297. See Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (interpreting
congressional intent in favor of a policy to protect children from lead-based paint).
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judicial review simpler, even though courts never said that openly? All of
the above? The underlying rationale(s) for Chevron remain obscure, again
partly because of its origins.
We do not propose any particular method for resolving questions about
Chevron methodology. We simply point out that the Chevron decision itself is
a dead end. We think it ought to be a dead letter as well.
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